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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the thesis that implicit learning plays a role in learning 
about scientific phenomena, and subsequently, in conceptual change. Decades of 
research in learning science demonstrate that a primary challenge of science 
education is overcoming prior, naïve knowledge of natural phenomena in order to 
gain scientific understanding. Until recently, a key assumption of this research has 
been that to develop scientific understanding, learners must abandon their prior 
scientific intuitions and replace them with scientific concepts. However, a growing 
body of research shows that scientific intuitions persist, even among science 
experts. This suggests that naïve intuitions are suppressed, not supplanted, as 
learners gain scientific understanding. The current study examines two potential 
roles of implicit learning processes in the development of scientific knowledge. 
First, implicit learning is a source of cognitive structures that impede science 
learning. Second, tasks that engage implicit learning processes can be employed 
to activate and suppress prior intuitions, enhancing the likelihood that scientific 
concepts are adopted and applied. This second proposal is tested in two 
experiments that measure training-induced changes in intuitive and conceptual 
knowledge related to sinking and floating objects in water. In Experiment 1, an 
implicit learning task was developed to examine whether implicit learning can 
induce changes in performance on near and far transfer tasks. The results of this 
experiment provide evidence that implicit learning tasks activate and suppress 
scientific intuitions. Experiment 2 examined the effects of combining implicit 
learning with traditional, direct instruction to enhance explicit learning of science 
concepts. This experiment demonstrates that sequencing implicit learning task 
before and after direct instruction has different effects on intuitive and conceptual 
knowledge. Together, these results suggest a novel approach for enhancing 
learning for conceptual change in science education.  
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Overview 
Well before reaching the science classroom, children develop knowledge 
and beliefs about how the world works. These ideas are acquired through everyday 
experiences starting from infancy (Au, 1994; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Piaget, 1976; 
Spelke, 1990; for review, see Baillargeon, 2002). They are deeply held and 
resistant to change from formal instruction (Chi, 2005; Chinn & Brewer, 1993; 
Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, Hedman, Fournier, 2001; Hammer, 1996; McCloskey, 
1983; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993). In some cases, these ideas are 
incongruent with scientific understanding. The science education literature refers 
to these as “intuitive,” “alternative,” or “naïve” science ideas, concepts, beliefs, or 
theories, or simply as “scientific misconceptions” (for reviews, see Confrey, 1990; 
Pfundt & Duit, 1993; West & Pines, 1985). Thus, science education depends on, 
and is in fact the business of, conceptual change – the process by which students’ 
previous, naïve concepts give way to mature scientific understanding (Carey, 
1985, 2000; Duit & Treagust, 2003; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; 
Strike & Posner, 1992).  
Although research on conceptual change has been conducted for several 
decades (e.g. Chi, 1992, 2008; diSessa, 1988, 1993; Posner et al., 1982; Strike & 
Posner, 1992; Vosniadou, 1994), there is no consensus on how conceptual 
change is best achieved through instruction (Lin, Yen, Liang, Chiu, & Guo, 2016; 
Özdemir & Clark, 2007). Divergence in viewpoints may stem from a lack of clarity 
about what changes constitute conceptual change (diSessa & Sherin, 1998; 
Rusanen, 2014; Taber, 2011). For example, some of the changes theorists have 
suggested that constitute conceptual change include changes in epistemological 
beliefs (Vosniadou, 1994), ontological categories (Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994), 
arrangement of pieces of knowledge (diSessa, 1993, 2002), or responses to 
anomalous data (Chinn & Brewer, 1998).  
  
2 
In addition to differing accounts of the changes that occur in conceptual 
change, few, if any, theories specify the mechanisms by which these changes 
occur (Clement, 2008). As Rusanen (2014) has argued, an explanation of 
conceptual change must offer (1) a description of the information processing task, 
and (2) a sufficiently accurate and detailed description of the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for the task of conceptual change. Current theories of 
conceptual change fail to describe how well-researched psychological constructs 
such as attention, short- and long-term memory, and executive functions contribute 
to or constrain the process of conceptual change (Rusanen & Pöyhönen, 2013).  
Current conceptual change theories are also limited in their ability to explain 
non-rational behaviors associated with science learning. One criticism of early 
accounts of conceptual change was that they assumed cold cognition – that 
students (and scientist) think and learn in overly rational ways. Theorists have 
argued that this approach ignores the influence from “hot” cognition involving 
motivational, emotional, and social contextual variables (Pintrich, Marx, Boyle, & 
Summer, 1993). Meanwhile, psychological research has revealed the prevalence 
of cognitive biases, which describe conditions and contexts that result in 
“predictably irrational” thinking and behavior prevalent in human cognition (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974; Ariely, 2010). Further research is needed to explain the 
irrationality observed in people’s thinking that persists after they have been 
exposed to science concepts.  
Another important criticism of the conceptual change involves 
methodological issues related to researching conceptual change (Taber, 2011). A 
recent review of the literature found that, of 116 empirical studies on conceptual 
change between 1982 and 2011, the majority focus on instructional interventions, 
often including multiple interventions without taking student characteristics into 
consideration (Lin et al., 2016). These studies may demonstrate whether or not 
conceptual change interventions are effective; however, they bring little clarity to 
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the question of why and for whom these techniques work. An empirical challenge 
for conceptual change research lies in developing techniques to capture the 
changes that occur during learning (Magnusson, Templin, & Boyle, 1997). Thus, 
more tools are needed to examine what changes in conceptual change.  
This dissertation research attempts to address these issues by exploring 
the role of implicit learning (Reber, 1967, 1989; Seger, 1994; Shanks, 2004) – the 
acquisition of complex knowledge in the absence of intention or awareness – in 
the development of scientific knowledge and conceptual change. A central goal of 
this dissertation is to demonstrate how theory and methods from implicit learning 
research can be applied to provide insight into the cognitive processes involved in 
scientific understanding and conceptual change. In the chapters that follow, we 
develop and test the general hypothesis that implicit learning processes can be 
leveraged in instructional settings to enhance conceptual change by activating and 
suppressing prior intuitive knowledge. 
A central challenge to conceptual change theory and research is how to 
effectively characterize, address, and assess students’ prior, inaccurate 
knowledge. Chapter 1 reviews previous approaches to this challenge, discussing 
prior research in terms of the coherence of misconceptions and the role of student 
characteristics in conceptual change processes. We then consider recent 
methodological and theoretical developments that bring into question certain 
aspects of prior conceptual change accounts. Specifically, this research shows that 
prior, intuitive beliefs are suppressed, not supplanted, by scientific understanding. 
This review raises two important questions: (1) From where do scientific intuitions 
come? and (2) How can instructional interventions enhance the suppression of 
inaccurate intuitions? These questions are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively, in terms of theory and research on implicit learning. 
Scientific intuitions important for conceptual change may develop through 
implicit learning. In models of conceptual change, unconsciously held conceptual 
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structures–such as ontological categories, epistemological beliefs, or 
phenomenological primitives–explain why some science concepts are difficult to 
learn. These conceptual structures may be acquired through experience, without 
intention or awareness to learn. Research on implicit learning—which occurs in the 
absence of intention and awareness—may offer insights into how scientific 
intuitions develop and change, as well as methods for examining them. In Chapter 
2, implicit learning processes are further discussed as a source of scientific 
intuitions. 
Implicit learning may also be leveraged to make science instruction more 
effective. Emerging research suggests that learning for conceptual change 
involves inhibition of previous intuitive ideas. Evidence from reaction time (Babai, 
Sekal, & Stavy, 2009; Potvin, Masson, Lafortune, & Cyr, 2014; Shtulman & 
Valcarcel, 2012) and neuroimaging studies (Dunbar, Fugelsang, & Stein, 2007; 
Foisy, Potvin, Riopel, & Masson, 2015; Masson, Potvin, Riopel, & Foisy, 2014) 
supports the view that experts engage inhibitory mechanisms when processing 
scientific information. Further, there is evidence that activating inhibitory control 
mechanisms can hinder intuitive reasoning (Babai, Eidelman, & Stavy, 2012), 
which may offer valuable opportunities for instructional interventions to promote 
conceptual change. Research and theory related to the role of inhibitory processes 
in conceptual change are discussed in Chapter 3. 
This dissertation research examines a novel approach for examining 
intuitive science ideas. Simple judgment tasks, based on implicit learning 
paradigms, provide empirical evidence that intuitive science ideas influence 
processing throughout the development of a concept from novice to expert 
understanding. These tasks also provide opportunities to train learners to suppress 
intuitive ideas by activating inhibitory processes. In Experiment 1, presented in 
Chapter 4, learners are presented with a task designed to activate intuitive ideas 
related to sinking and floating objects (i.e. “heavier/larger objects sink,” “hollow 
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objects float,” “holes make objects sink”). The accuracy and reaction time 
measures are compared to conceptual knowledge assessment measures to 
examine the relationship between intuitive and scientific knowledge. Comparison 
of reaction times and accuracy across items that are congruent or incongruent with 
intuitive ideas support the claim that implicit learning can influence intuitive 
knowledge. This effect was influenced by degree to which task directions guided 
participants to either explicitly test hypotheses or to make implicit judgments based 
on intuitions.  
Experiment 2 provides further exploration of how implicit learning tasks can 
be used to impact conceptual change. Implicit training tasks may enhance learning 
for conceptual change by providing opportunities to apply concepts acquired by 
direct instruction. That is, conceptual change occurs when explicit learning 
precedes implicit learning by reinforcing explicitly learned rules. On the other hand, 
conceptual change may be enhanced when implicit learning tasks prepare learners 
for direct instruction. In this experiment, participants completed implicit learning 
tasks and received direct instruction via text in varying sequences. Conceptual 
knowledge of sinking and floating objects was then assessed through traditional 
assessment items, as well as implicit judgment tasks. Although direct instruction 
led to greater gains in conceptual knowledge, as compared to Experiment 1, the 
effects on intuitive knowledge depended on whether implicit learning tasks 
occurred before or after direct instruction. The results of Experiment 2 are further 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
The results of these experiments provide insights into how we understand 
the nature of the scientific knowledge that students bring to the classroom from 
informal learning environments, as well as directions for designing instruction to 
address and change those intuitions. This work builds on emerging research that 
shows that inhibition plays an important role in conceptual change, and provides 
empirical support for models of conceptual change that emphasize the prevalence 
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of scientific concepts. The implications and limitations of the experimental results, 
as well as directions for future research, are further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
  
  
7 
Chapter 1: The Persistence of Scientific Intuitions 
 
A central challenge in science education research is explaining how intuitive 
science ideas give way to scientific understanding – a process referred to as 
conceptual change. Historically, conceptual change research in science education 
has approached this challenge by (1) cataloging and characterizing the prevalence 
and nature of common misconceptions; (2) measuring the effects of various 
student characteristics on conceptual change; and (3) developing and testing 
instructional interventions for invoking conceptual change among students. In this 
chapter, I review selected findings from the literature in each of these areas that 
inform the current research. Then, I discuss recent developments in conceptual 
change research that inform this dissertation research. I conclude by providing a 
definition of scientific intuitions, informed by conceptual change theory and findings 
from cognitive science. 
 
A (Brief) History of Conceptual Change Research 
The history of conceptual change research in science can be traced back 
to the late 1970s, when a critical turning point for science education research 
occurred. Building on the work of Piaget (1976) and constructivist psychologists 
(e.g. Ausubel, 1968), researchers began reporting about students’ rich, yet 
inaccurate, ideas about scientific phenomena. The early work in this area 
catalogued the myriad incorrect ideas and explanations about scientific 
phenomena generated by students; researchers referred to this prior knowledge 
as “misconceptions,” “alternative frameworks,” or simply “student ideas” (Driver, 
Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott, 1994; Driver & Easley, 1978; Driver, Guesne, & 
Tiberghien, 1985; Novak, 1977; Nussbaum & Novick, 1982; Pfundt & Duit, 1985; 
Viennot, 1979). This “first wave of a cognitive approach” (Roth, 2008, p. 31) to 
understanding students’ prior knowledge was no doubt inspired by David 
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Ausubel’s insight that “The most important single factor influencing learning is what 
the learner already knows” (1968, p. vi, quoted in Duit & Treagust, 1998).  
The next important finding made by researchers studying students’ naïve 
science ideas was that this knowledge persists across age levels and in spite of 
instruction. For example, students demonstrate misconceptions about physics 
concepts, such as that “motion implies force,” across a range of ages and contexts 
(Clement, 1982; McCloskey, 1983). Similar observations have been made about a 
variety of scientific concepts, such as astronomy (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), 
sound and light (Mazens & Lautrey, 2003; Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000), 
heat and temperature (Wiser & Carey, 1983), and biology (Babai, Sekal, & Stavy, 
2009; Coley & Tanner, 2015). Of particular concern is that intuitive ideas persist 
despite science instruction directly counteracting misconceptions (Champagne, 
Gunstone, & Klopfer, 1983; Duit & Treagust, 2003; Eaton, Anderson, & Smith, 
1984; Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, Hedman, & Fournier, 2001; Smith, diSessa, & 
Roschelle, 1993; Tirosh, Stavy, & Cohen, 1998). This prompted researchers to 
attempt to explain why certain types of prior knowledge are difficult to overcome. 
 
Models of conceptual change 
 In the early 1980s, Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gerzog (1982) proposed 
what has become known as the classical model of conceptual change (Vosniadou, 
2012). According to this model, conceptual change is initiated by generating 
dissatisfaction with existing conceptions. Subsequently, the learner must find the 
scientific conceptions presented to be intelligible (clear enough to be understood), 
plausible (possibly correct or true), and fruitful (productive for solving problems) 
(Posner et al., 1982). This classical model later incorporated the idea of 
“conceptual ecology” – the cognitive artifacts, epistemic commitments and 
metaphysical beliefs held by the learner, as well as the milieu of the learner’s 
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personal and social goals, attitudes, and motivations (Strike & Posner, 1985; 
1992). 
This classical model described by Posner and colleagues (1982) has been 
highly influential in science education research and instructional design, 
particularly in identifying the role of conceptual conflict in conceptual change. 
However, there are many ways in which this theory falls short of capturing 
important aspects of conceptual change (Vosniadou, 2012). For example, the 
classical account predicts that a sudden shift in conceptual knowledge should 
occur when learners move from an old theory to a new one. However, evidence 
shows that conceptual change tends to be a slow, incremental change among 
students (Carey, 2000; Mazens & Lautrey, 2003). The classical account of 
conceptual change also did not address the influence of affective, motivational, 
and social factors during learning (Hitano & Inagaki, 2003; Sinatra & Pintrich, 
2003). Further, the classical account was meant to be epistemological, rather than 
psychological, in nature (Strike & Posner, 1992). Thus, this theory draws primarily 
from literature in history and philosophy of science and focuses on describing the 
development of normative, rational beliefs, as opposed to cognitive mechanisms 
supported by psychological theory. 
Soon after the development of the classical account of conceptual change 
in science education, researchers in the field of developmental psychology 
became interested in how young children develop concepts of scientific 
phenomena starting from an early age (Carey, 1985; Gopnik, 1996). Like the 
classical accounts of conceptual change, this perspective was heavily influenced 
by the observed similarities between cognitive development in children and 
accounts of scientific theory change observed by historians and philosophers of 
science (Gopnik, 1996). Researchers in this area conducted developmental 
studies of how children’s ideas about various scientific phenomena change over 
time, in domains such as physical laws that govern objects and substances (e.g. 
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Au, 1994; Spelke, 1990), biological categories such as living thing, person, animal, 
plant, etc. (e.g. Carey, 1985; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994), and folk psychology (e.g. 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). Because populations of learners in these studies are 
very young (infant to preschool age) and studies often employ non-verbal 
assessment methods such as categorization and analysis of looking behaviors. 
A common view among developmental psychologists is that children hold 
‘theory-like’ structures that shape their beliefs and observations, and that these 
theories change over time (Carey, 2000; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Gopnik, 1996). 
These structures are ‘theory-like’ in that they afford children to engage in cognitive 
activities similar to scientists, such as prediction, interpretation and explanation of 
evidence. However, these cognitive structures do not hold the same status as 
scientific theories in that they do not operate at an explicit, conscious level. 
Nevertheless, developmental psychologists view conceptual change as involving 
changes in children’s cohesive underlying theoretical framework of the material 
world. Developmental psychologists have theorized that some knowledge is 
innate, forming “core knowledge” around which new skills and beliefs are built 
using the same cognitive devices adults use in science (Gopnik, 2003; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007). However, unlike adult scientists, the abstract, coherent systems of 
causal entities and rules that make up children’s theories are not demonstrated 
explicitly through language and symbols.  
Another prominent theory of conceptual change is the “ontological shift” 
model (Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994). This conceptual change theory 
proposes that some of the difficulties learners have in acquiring scientific concepts 
arise from the improper characterization of the ontological nature of scientific 
concepts (Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994; Thagard, 1992). A key assumption of this 
model is that people associate concepts with distinct ontological categories, such 
as processes, ideas, and material substances (Chi, 1992; Slotta & Chi, 2006). 
These categories assign different attributes to their members; for example, 
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substances take up space while processes occur over time. When learning about 
scientific concepts, learners often misapply ontological categories to explain and 
make predictions about natural phenomena (Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000). 
For example, when describing phenomena related to force or heat, novices apply 
characteristics common to substance; they might say a force is “all used up” or 
that heat is a material made of “hot molecules” (Chi, 2013). On the other hand, 
science experts view these concepts as emergent processes – they occur over 
time, and have causal or non-causal agents. This “ontological shift” model 
suggests that one way to encourage conceptual change is to make learners aware 
of categorical mistakes through ontological training (Slotta & Chi, 2006). Although 
this theory proposes how these cognitive structures influence conceptual change, 
it does not provide an explanation for how ontological categories and their 
associated attributes are acquired. 
The “framework theory” model of conceptual change also suggests that 
children have cohesive, well-organized theories are responsible for producing 
specific beliefs about scientific phenomena (Vosniadou, 1994, 2012). This model 
claims that children develop explanations and synthetic mental models based on 
a framework theory composed of their epistemological beliefs, ontological 
commitments, and the observational evidence available. Thus, conceptual change 
involves the development of these underlying cognitive structures. For example, 
children’s epistemological commitments may mature from perceptually-based 
naïve realism (e.g. “Things are as they appear”) to a more sophisticated scientific 
epistemology (e.g. “Models can explain phenomena that can’t be seen”). In the 
“framework theory,” children develop scientifically naïve epistemologies and 
ontologies before they come to school through their perceptual experiences 
(Vosniadou, 2012). 
Observations from structured interviews of students provide evidence that 
students combine the ideas they are taught in school with their epistemological 
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and ontological preconceptions gained through everyday experiences. When this 
occurs, students create synthetic mental models of scientific phenomena 
(Vosniadou, 2002; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). For example, when children are 
taught that Earth is round, they combine this information with their ontological 
presuppositions of ‘Earth as an object’ (as opposed to ‘Earth as an astronomical 
body,’ like the Moon) and the epistemic commitment that ‘things are as they seem’ 
(i.e. the Earth looks flat from everyday experience). This combination of 
presuppositions and learned ideas results in an idiosyncratic, synthetic mental 
model of the Earth. In this case students develop a “flattened disc” model of Earth 
that preserves the view of Earth as an object, combined with the view that the Earth 
looks flat from a first-person point-of-view. 
The conceptual change theories discussed above emphasize a coherent 
and organized nature of learners’ pre-instructional knowledge. The knowledge-as-
elements perspective has emerged as a prominent opposing stance in conceptual 
change literature. Theorists from this perspective object to previous accounts of 
conceptual change for several reasons (Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993). First, 
viewing misconceptions as coherent and wrong implies that they only hinder 
science learning. This view is incongruent with constructivist views of learning that 
identify prior knowledge as an important resource for learning. Second, viewing 
children’s knowledge as theory-like suggests that conceptual change involves a 
shift from a learner’s current theory to a scientific one. In this process, old theories 
are abandoned in favor of new, more fruitful theories, in a manner akin to “scientific 
revolutions” described by Kuhn (1962). However, evidence suggests that 
conceptual change is a slow, gradual process that occurs over extended periods 
of time (Caravita & Hallden, 1994; Mazens & Lautrey, 2003). Another criticism 
includes the overemphasis on generating cognitive conflict. Students often 
overlook anomalies or explain them away to avoid conflict (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). 
In order to address these and other concerns, researchers have developed 
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theories that explain misconceptions by taking a more atomic view of science 
ideas. 
According to the knowledge-in-pieces view, intuitive science knowledge is 
composed of multiple, small, independent conceptual elements that interact in an 
ad hoc basis depending on the relevant situation (diSessa, 1988). One of the key 
proponents of this view, Andrea diSessa, proposed the existence of 
phenomenological primitives (p-prims) – simple, isolated, self-contained pieces of 
knowledge that come from superficial interpretations of the physical world 
(diSessa, 1988, 1993; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993). P-prims are 
phenomenological in the sense that they arise from our experience of the world; 
they are primitive in the sense that they are minimal abstractions that are self-
evident. For example, the p-prim “closer means stronger” arises from everyday 
experiences with the transfer of heat and light energy: a flame will feel warmer and 
look brighter as you get closer to it. However, when this productive bit of knowledge 
is applied to the causes of the seasons on Earth (i.e. “Seasons are caused by 
Earth being closer to the Sun in summer”), it would appear as a misconception—
seasons are not caused by the distance between the Sun and Earth, but by 
changes in the incidence of sunlight caused by the tilt of Earth’s axis. Although p-
prims have truth value based on everyday experiences, they can also generate 
misconceptions when inappropriately applied to explain scientific phenomena. 
According to the knowledge-in-pieces perspective, conceptual change is an 
evolutionary process by which weakly structured prior ideas (i.e., p-prims) become 
increasingly contextualized and connected to new concepts through addition and 
reorganization of a network of knowledge elements (Özdemir & Clark, 2007). Thus, 
conceptual change is a slow, evolutionary process due to the numerous mental 
manipulations needed to reorganize pieces of knowledge into a cohesive, 
systematic structure. This model of conceptual change explains the persistence of 
misconceptions through the fact that p-prims do not go away or disappear; they 
  
14 
continue to be a part of a reorganized conceptual system. While p-prims can lead 
to inaccurate science beliefs, they remain useful in non-scientific contexts. and 
because they have been gained through a multitude of experiences, they are 
difficult to change.  
Despite theoretical differences in these models, there is widespread 
agreement about several aspects of conceptual change. First, learners acquire 
naïve science knowledge from their everyday experience. Second, science 
knowledge begins developing early, starting in infancy (Keil, 2011). Third, intuitive 
knowledge influences how students process information during instruction 
(Özdemir & Clark, 2007). Fourth, this knowledge is highly resistant to change via 
instruction (Carey, 2000; Chi, Slotta, & deLeeuw, 1994; diSessa, 1982; Guzzetti, 
Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993; Özdemir & Clark, 2007; Vosniadou, 1994). Finally, 
and most relevant for the current research, the conceptual structures that explain 
difficulties associated with conceptual change (i.e. core knowledge, ontological 
categories, epistemological beliefs, and p-prims) are acquired and exert their 
influence in an automatic, unconscious, and unintentional manner.  
The models of conceptual change described above all propose conceptual 
structures that make science learning difficult. Further, each of these models 
suggest that scientific understanding results from changes in these conceptual 
structures—core knowledge is tested, ontological categories shift, epistemological 
beliefs mature, and p-prims are rearranged. An important missing piece of these 
models is a psychological account of how these knowledge structures are formed 
and changed. In Chapter 2, I will describe psychological accounts of implicit 
learning, arguing that these processes are a source of the prior knowledge that 
influences conceptual change. 
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Student characteristics that influence conceptual change 
Another important theme over the history of conceptual change research is 
the influence of various student characteristics on conceptual change processes. 
Over the past 30 years of conceptual change research, commonly-studied student 
characteristics are gender, grade level, reasoning ability, emotion/motivation, and 
prior knowledge (Lin, et al., 2016). Other than gender, the two most often studied 
student characteristics are reasoning ability and emotional/motivational variables. 
Below, I describe some of the major findings in each of these areas. 
Scientific reasoning ability appears to be an important factor in conceptual 
change processes. As with research on conceptual change, research on scientific 
reasoning has its roots in Piaget’s observations of the development of thinking 
abilities. According to his well-known theory, children progress through stages of 
development, reaching the formal operational stage in early adolescence. This 
stage is characterized by hypothetico-deductive reasoning and abstract thought, 
which are most closely associated with scientific reasoning (Piaget, 1976). Lawson 
(1987) developed the Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning ability to measure 
students’ ability to perform mental operations associated with science concepts. 
Several of the items on this task are similar to Piagetian tasks used to examine the 
development of cognitive abilities in young children (e.g., pendulum and balance 
beam tasks).  
Research employing this test suggests that the development of scientific 
reasoning is correlated with conceptual change. For example, Kwon and Lawson 
(2000) used a modified version of the scientific reasoning test to examine 
associated changes in conceptual knowledge about air pressure in students 13 to 
17 years old. They concluded that conceptual knowledge acquisition involves the 
ability to inhibit task-irrelevant information, as well as represent abstract scientific 
concepts. Their research showed that these abilities increase over the course of 
adolescence.  
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Other researchers have employed a similar approach to understanding the 
relationship between concept learning and reasoning by measuring how individual 
differences in cognitive ability are related to science knowledge acquisition (Al 
khawaldeh & Al Olaimat, 2010; Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Liao & She, 2009; Lin 
et al., 2016). Researchers have hypothesized that ability constructs associated 
with deliberate control and manipulation of symbols, such as working memory and 
fluid intelligence, are likely to correlate with science learning. For example, in a 
review of five studies, Yuan and colleagues (2006) examined the relationship 
between working memory capacity and science learning tasks (such as science 
achievement tests and chemistry problem-solving), finding evidence for modest 
positive correlation.  
On the other hand, evidence suggests that general cognitive abilities are a 
necessary, but not sufficient, driving factor for scientific concept development. In a 
large-scale study of college students in China and the United States, Bao and 
collaborators (2009) found that while students demonstrate similar levels of 
domain-general scientific reasoning ability, Chinese students perform much better 
than American students on conceptual inventories of physics topics (mechanics, 
electricity and magnetism). The authors conclude that differences in conceptual 
knowledge can be accounted for by differences in science instruction across these 
populations, but that these differences do not affect students’ scientific reasoning 
abilities. An alternative interpretation is that cognitive abilities are not sufficient for 
the development of conceptual knowledge. Put another way, unlike scientific 
reasoning abilities, conceptual knowledge is not likely to develop without adequate 
exposure and effective instruction.  
Another line of research has examined the role of emotional and 
motivational factors in driving conceptual change. In a seminal article, Pintrich, 
Boyle, & Marx (1993) argued that motivational constructs, such as goals, values, 
self-efficacy, and control beliefs, are potential mediators of conceptual change. 
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This argument against a “cold,” overly-rational model of conceptual change has 
led to a body of work exploring how non-cognitive constructs influence science 
learning. For example, a recent study showed that for students with high levels of 
prior misconceptions, having high self-efficacy, confidence and interest can 
improve the likelihood of conceptual change (Cordova, Sinatra, Jones, 
Taasoobshirazi, & Lombardi, 2014). This research suggests that a mixture of these 
motivational and self-belief constructs can modulate the effects of prior knowledge, 
instructional interventions, and cognitive abilities on conceptual change. 
 
Recent Developments in Conceptual Change 
Recent theory and research reveals three important insights regarding the 
nature of learner’s naïve knowledge. First, naïve knowledge is situated in the task 
environment (Kloos, Fisher, & Van Orden, 2010; Roth, 2008; Vosniadou, 2007). 
Second, alternative conceptions are the result of heuristic, rather than logical, 
reasoning (diSessa & Sherin, 1998; Talanquer, 2009). Third, naïve knowledge 
structures are suppressed, not supplanted in experts’ knowledge structures 
(Shtulman & Varcarcel, 2012; Potvin, Masson, Lafortune, & Cyr, 2014). Together, 
these ideas have important implications for how conceptual change is understood 
and suggest new approaches to instruction for conceptual change. 
 
Naïve knowledge is situated in the task environment 
Early conceptual change theory addressed knowledge from a cognitive 
perspective; more recently, researchers have shifted toward understanding 
learning from a situated view (Billett, 1996; Vosniadou, 2007). From a cognitive 
perspective, knowledge is held in the mind of the individual learner. Learning 
occurs through an individual’s general abilities and the acquisition of concepts, 
symbols, and language. The development of these mental skills allows the learner 
to recognize patterns, solve problems, and explain phenomena. On the other hand, 
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the situated perspective approaches knowledge as “a relation between the 
individual and a social or physical situation” (Greeno, 1989, p. 1). Rather than an 
object or thing in the mind, knowledge is an individual’s “potential for situated 
activity” (Greeno, 1989, p. 1).  
Recently, researchers have developed empirical support for a situated view 
of scientific misconceptions. Knowledge of sinking and floating objects has been 
shown to be sensitive to task conditions. Kloos, Fisher, & Van Orden (2010) 
examined how task constraints influenced children and adults’ performance on a 
density judgment task – predicting whether an object sinks or floats in water. The 
researchers manipulated the salience of the density variable by presenting objects 
in pairs where mass, volume, and density dimensions were either confounded or 
unconfounded with one another. For example, a confounded pair of objects might 
include a ball with a larger volume, but smaller density, than the other ball. Thus, 
although this ball is bigger, it is more likely to float. Results of this study showed 
that task performance on the same object varied based whether or not the pair 
was confounded on these variables, providing further evidence to question the 
traditional cognitive view of knowledge as a stable representation in memory. 
Even when presumably stable cognitive abilities are taken into account, 
they may interact with situational task variables. In a study conducted by Wang, 
Varma, & Varma (2012), participants predicted whether single objects would sink 
or float in water. Participants’ cognitive abilities were also measured using well-
established executive function (EF) ability measures, the Dimensional Change 
Card Sort (Zelazo, 2006) and Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Objects were 
presented in either a random or structured sequence. In the structured sequence, 
the number of changes in object characteristics from trial-to-trial was minimized, 
and sequences were designed to challenge common intuitive beliefs by first 
presenting objects congruent with intuitive rules about sinking and floating objects 
(e.g. “heavy objects sink”, “hollow objects float”) followed by objects incongruent 
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with intuitive beliefs. Results from this study showed that, across participants, 
prediction accuracy was higher and reaction time lower in the structured sequence 
condition. Further, the sequence conditions interacted with individual differences 
in executive function (EF) ability (as measured by Dimensional Change Card Sort 
and Flanker tasks) such that participants with lower EF ability benefitted more from 
the structured sequence. That is, variation in cognitive abilities may hinder the 
degree of knowledge elicited depending on the characteristics of the task. 
Together, these results challenge the cognitive view of knowledge as a 
stable and coherent mental entity in the minds of individual learners. The 
knowledge demonstrated by learners is sensitive to various aspects of the tasks 
used to elicit them. There are at least two important practical implications of the 
situated view of science knowledge. First, the situated view further emphasizes the 
importance of creating learning opportunities that account for how tasks interact 
with learners’ characteristics, such as individual differences in prior knowledge and 
cognitive ability. Second, and more importantly, mature understanding of scientific 
concepts may be conceptualized as reduction in the interaction between individual 
and situational variables. That is, as a learner’s understanding of a concept 
develops, their performance on tasks requiring this knowledge is less influenced 
by representations, questions, and task features. 
 
Misconceptions are the result of heuristic, rather than logical, reasoning 
The second important area of progress in conceptual change theory is in 
our understanding of the underlying conceptual structures that produce 
misconceptions. An important implication of the knowledge-as-elements approach 
is that students’ naïve knowledge is best understood in terms of implicit empirical 
assumptions and heuristic reasoning, as opposed to the empirical evidence and 
logical arguments favored in scientific practice. That is, although the goal of 
science education is to promote scientific thinking based on logical reasoning from 
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evidence, novice science learners are much more likely to apply everyday thinking 
based on non-scientific assumptions and heuristics.  
For example, Talanquer (2006) developed a framework for classifying 
common alternative conceptions in chemistry in terms of 5 empirical assumptions 
(continuity, substantialism, essentialism, mechanical causality, teleology) and 4 
heuristic reasoning strategies (association, reduction, fixation, linear sequencing). 
Attempts to address misconceptions must therefore target common assumptions 
or heuristics that learners readily apply when encountering scientific concepts both 
outside and inside the classroom. This view also suggests that learning 
progressions involving conceptual change involves a change in both underlying 
knowledge (from empirical assumptions to evidence) and reasoning (heuristic to 
logical arguments) (Berland & McNeill, 2010; Maeyer & Talanquer, 2013; Mohan, 
Chen, & Anderson, 2009; Talanquer, 2009). 
 
Naïve knowledge structures are suppressed, not supplanted 
Finally, recent research employing reaction time and brain imaging methods 
support the view that naïve ideas about scientific phenomena continue to influence 
cognitive processes, even in experts with mature scientific understanding. In a 
study conducted by Shtulman and Varcarcel (2012), experts where asked to 
determine whether statements were true or false as quickly as possible. There 
were two types of statements: statements with truth-values consistent across naïve 
and scientific theories (e.g. “The Moon revolves around Earth”) and statements 
with truth-values inconsistent across naïve and scientific theories (e.g. “Earth 
revolves around the Sun”).  The results showed that experts were slower and less 
accurate at verifying inconsistent statements compared to consistent statements, 
across several domains. The authors conclude that misconceptions are 
suppressed, rather than supplanted by scientific knowledge. Additional reaction 
time and brain imaging studies have confirmed that intuitive ideas about scientific 
phenomena persist in experts (Babai, Sekal, & Stavy, 2009; Potvin, Masson, 
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Lafortune, & Cyr, 2014; Masson, Potvin, Riopel, & Foisy, 2014). A similar 
phenomenon, called the continued influence effect of misinformation, has been 
previously documented in the memory literature (Johnson & Seifert, 1994).  
Thus, conceptual change is not a process of replacing naïve ideas with 
correct ideas. Rather, conceptual change occurs when people learn to successfully 
suppress naïve ideas. This suppression, in turn, provides the setting for acquiring, 
strengthening, and activating scientifically accurate structures in working memory. 
Thus, conceptual change instruction should be focused on helping learners 
suppress naïve knowledge structures.   
 
Defining ‘scientific intuition’ 
Although the term misconception remains a useful term for referring to 
students’ inaccurate in science education at large, recent developments in 
conceptual change research and the historical implications that comes with the 
use of the term suggest the need for a more precise phrase. Over the past several 
decades, researchers have introduced several terms to describe students’ 
inaccurate science ideas, including alternative conceptions (Gilbert & Watts, 
1983), mental models (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), preconceptions (Clement, 
1993), and naïve ideas (Nehm & Ha, 2011). Based on the recent developments in 
conceptual change described above, these terms do not adequately account for 
the situated and heuristic nature of misconceptions. Further, they imply structural 
equivalence with scientific knowledge. That is, these terms do not make it clear 
that the nature of students’ prior knowledge is qualitatively different from explicit 
scientific knowledge. To better capture these differences, I propose the use of the 
term scientific intuition to refer to the broad class of mental structures that are 
responsible for producing the scientific misconceptions observed regularly across 
people.   
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While intuition can be used in various ways in relation to science knowledge 
(see Bunge, 1962 for examples), for the purpose of this dissertation, I define 
intuition as: the unconsciously activated implicit knowledge structures that that 
underlie the explicit expressions of knowledge, such as predictions and reasoning 
about phenomena. Intuitions are the assumptions or biases that one considers to 
be likely or true without further conscious reflection or explanation. This definition 
of intuition follows accounts of the qualitative differences between implicit and 
explicit knowledge and memory (Dienes & Perner, 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1986; 
Schacter, 1987). Scientific intuitions are qualitatively distinct from the beliefs 
directly observed behaviors or explicitly expressed language used by people; they 
are the unobserved facts or associations that are true or likely given the observed 
behaviors and verbal expression. It is also important to note that the use of 
scientific here is not intended to suggest that these intuitions are derived in a 
scientific manner or through formal scientific practices. Instead, this use refers to 
the fact that intuitions are relevant to scientific phenomena. 
Scientific intuition has several important characteristics that distinguish it 
from explicit, conceptual knowledge demonstrated in mature science 
understanding. First, intuition is gained through experience rather than reflection. 
Explicit knowledge may be gained through experience as well, but it also requires 
reflection and representation of general patterns perceived in the environment. 
Thus, one way to identify whether an idea or belief is intuitive is to determine 
whether or not it is congruent with covariance in the environment. For example, 
the scientific intuition “small objects float” reflects covariations found in people’s 
everyday experiences with objects—objects that are small are more likely to float. 
The second important characteristic of intuitions is that they are heuristic, rather 
than deterministic, in nature. Unlike explicit factual knowledge or principles, 
scientific intuitions are not applied equally everywhere. For example, children often 
express the intuition about forces and motion that forces tend to “run out” or fade 
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away, such as when a ball is thrown or rolled on a surface. Although this intuition 
can provide accurate predictions about a variety of phenomena, it cannot be 
applied universally in the same way scientific principles, such as Newton’s Laws 
of Motion and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity can.  
An important consideration for the use of the term intuition is the relationship 
between the scientific intuitions of novices and experts. For both novices and 
experts, scientific intuitions provide a basis for making predictions and 
explanations about scientific phenomena. For novices, the application of the 
intuitions they have gained through experience may be congruent or incongruent 
with predictions based on scientific principles. On the other hand, science experts 
may also develop new scientific intuitions based on their knowledge of scientific 
principles through extensive experience with them. Like novices, experts apply 
intuitions to provide explanations and make predictions about scientific 
phenomena. However, experts’ intuitions are grounded in assumptions that have 
been mathematically proven or empirically supported. For example, a physicist 
may have intuitions about how to apply scientific principles to solve problems 
related to force and motion (i.e. Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). In both experts 
and novices, intuitions represent complex knowledge of scientific phenomena, and 
they are expressed rapidly and without need for explicit justification.  
From this discussion of the scientific intuitions of novices and experts, two 
important ideas emerge. First, unlike the term misconception, intuitions do not 
imply scientific inaccuracy. Rather, intuitions reflect ideas assumed to be likely or 
true by a person, and serve as the basis for explanations, reasoning, or 
predictions. Second, intuitions must be considered in reference to a person for 
whom the idea is intuitive. For example, an expert may find the scientific 
conception of force (i.e. Newton’s 2nd Law of Motion) and its application to be 
intuitive—the expert refers and applies this idea to novel situations without need 
to further reference the logical and empirical evidence. On the other hand, a novice 
  
24 
does not find this idea intuitive, and may instead apply their own intuitive ideas of 
force in these situations. Put more generally, an idea or belief X may be intuitive 
to person Y, but not to person Z.  
The use of the term scientific intuition is also intended to reflect current 
understanding of the role of prior knowledge in science learning. Researchers have 
demonstrated that inaccurate prior knowledge can be a valuable resource for 
science learning. For example, Smith, diSessa, and Roschelle (1993) 
demonstrated that students’ prior knowledge provides raw material for formulating 
scientific theory, supports qualitative reasoning, and helps novices map everyday 
situations to scientific representations. This opposes the view of misconceptions 
as cohesive, stable ideas and beliefs that must be “replaced” or “overcome” 
through science instruction. Instead, scientific intuitions can be viewed as a source 
of predictions, explanations, and representations that can be addressed in an 
increasingly explicit manner through instruction. 
This definition of the term scientific intuition also addresses discussions 
about the “grain size” of knowledge associated with conceptual change research. 
Chi (2008, 2013) describes multiple types and levels at which misconceived 
knowledge conflicts with scientific knowledge: false beliefs, flawed mental models, 
category mistakes, and missing schema. The definition of scientific intuitions can 
be applied to multiple levels of misconceived knowledge described above.  
In the case of false beliefs, incorrect information that occurs at the level of 
a single idea, scientific intuitions may or may not be involved. A false belief such 
as “sharks do not suffer from cancer” may arise simply from the communication of 
misinformation. Often, these singular ideas can be traced back to a source of 
misinformation or cultural myth1. Other false beliefs may be specific instantiations 
of general scientific intuitions. For example, a student that endorses the idea that 
                                             
1 For example, the false belief that sharks do not suffer from cancer can be traced back to the 1992 
book Sharks Don’t Get Cancer by I. William Lane. Sharks can indeed suffer from cancer. 
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“the heart oxygenates blood” as true, may be operating on the more general 
intuition that “the heart has important functions involving blood.” This belief is an 
intuition in that that is assumed to be likely or true (i.e. no further proof or 
explanation is necessary) and it may be learned from repeated experience with 
prevalent associations between the heart and vital life functions involving blood. 
Thus, the false belief that “the heart oxygenates blood” is intuitive for novices in 
the sense that it is congruent with more general intuitions about the importance of 
the heart and blood. Successful revision of this false belief has been achieved by 
either explicit or implicit refutation (Chi & Roscoe, 2002). The relative ease with 
which this belief is revised may be explained by the fact that the more general 
intuition (i.e. “the heart has important functions related to blood”) stays intact in the 
face of the refutation. 
Another form of inaccurate knowledge, a flawed mental model, involves 
multiple, interrelated beliefs. For example, one topic in which misconceptions are 
commonly cited is the reason for seasonal differences in temperature on Earth. 
Novices often make assumptions about the changes in the distance between Earth 
and the Sun when explaining this phenomenon. In this case, one or more aspects 
of the learner’s mental model are inaccurate, missing, or incomplete. There are 
several scientific intuitions that are correct with this “inaccurate” model, such as 
that the Sun transfers energy to Earth and that being closer to a heat source 
transfer more heat. On the other hand, they likely do not have strong intuitions 
about the tilt of Earth’s axis and the differential heating caused by the angle of 
incidence of light. Thus, inaccurate knowledge at the flawed mental model level 
needs to be addressed by somehow maintaining and suppressing some parts of 
existing knowledge, while also connecting to new knowledge. 
Other types of misconceived knowledge are described by Chi as 
“incommensurate knowledge,” which involves a fundamental misalignment 
between categories on lateral branches or ontological trees. For example, students 
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often think of heat as belonging to the substance category. Assigning heat to this 
category means that it adopts the properties associated with that category– 
substances can be moved, trapped, and lost. However, a scientific understanding 
of heat views it as an emergent property. That is, the macroscopic phenomenon 
of heat emerges from the microscopic movement of molecules. Some theorists 
claim that conceptual change involves shifts in ontological categories (such as 
substance  process) or epistemological beliefs (such as the belief that 
“movement of inanimate objects requires explanation”). 
Ontological categories and epistemological beliefs are intuitive in that they 
are learned indirectly through experience, are assumed to be likely or true without 
further explanation. These categories and beliefs are gained without intention or 
direct instruction about them. Part of the difficulty in changing this type of 
knowledge is making learners aware that they have them in the first place. They 
are such an ingrained part of our everyday thinking that it is difficult to consider 
scientific phenomena without them. In fact, one of the recommended strategies for 
helping students is to provide explicit training on ontological categories (Slotta & 
Chi, 2006). While this type of instruction may be effective for some students, it is 
not clear why learning about ontological categories is likely to change them 
immediately – ontological categories and epistemological beliefs are gained 
through extended experiences that cause them to develop. Thus, it is more likely 
that these intuitions must be changed through circumstances similar to how they 
were developed. 
Misconceived knowledge may also be “incommensurate” when a schema 
needed for accurate scientific knowledge is completely missing. This missing 
schema type of misconceived knowledge helps explain why some concepts are 
particularly difficult for students to acquire. Missing schema related to science 
concepts are often difficult to develop because people have difficulty developing 
intuitions for them because of complexity, scale, or abstractness. For example, 
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statistical concepts related to probability are often difficult for people to learn 
because they do not have intuitions about abstract concepts like distributions and 
sampling. Thus, a challenge for science instruction is determining methods and 
means for helping students develop intuitions about unfamiliar and abstract 
concepts. 
To give another example about how this definition of scientific intuition can 
be applied to understand inaccurate scientific knowledge, consider the example of 
extramission beliefs. Researchers have studied a flawed mental model related to 
human perception–the view that human vision is dependent on emissions output 
from the eye (for review, see Winer, Cottrell, Gregg, Fournier, & Bica, 2002). This 
misconception has been shown to be prevalent (in some cases, over 50% of adults 
demonstrate this belief) and persistent after instruction (Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, 
Hedman, & Fournier, 2001). To understand the source of this misconception, 
consider scientific intuitions related to “vision”: seeing involves light; light is usually 
emitted from a source (the Sun, bulb, fire, etc.); we see things we “point” or direct 
our eyes at; other devices that “see”—like radars and lasers—emit something in 
order to sense. These intuitive associations and heuristics are congruent with our 
everyday experiences and may lead to extramission beliefs under certain 
constraints, such as the words, images, and questions used to elicit these ideas 
(Winer, Cottrell, Karefilaki, & Gregg, 1996). Thus, while the results of this thinking 
are mistaken beliefs in light of scientific understanding, the sources of these 
mistakes are reconcilable in consideration of the everyday experiences of learners 
and the types of intuitive knowledge they glean from them. 
In relation to the debate over the coherence of naïve scientific knowledge, 
the use of the term scientific intuition may provide a middle path that can explain 
both the coherence and incoherence of misconceptions. Scientific intuitions are 
robust in that they are learned from everyday experiences. Therefore, they are 
readily available and applicable to a wide range of phenomena. For example, our 
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scientific intuition that gravity works in a downward direction is based on 
overwhelming information from the environment. A scientific notion of gravity as a 
force between any two bodies is much more difficult to grasp because we have 
few readily perceivable examples of this concept on which to develop intuitions. 
Thus, by sheer amount of experience, we are more likely to apply our scientific 
intuitions about gravity, rather than a scientific principle, in a given circumstance. 
Misconceptions are also incoherent because they are based on intuitions 
that are applied in a heuristic, rather than deterministic, manner. In a given 
circumstance, a person may or may not apply their intuitions based on myriad 
factors, such as the questions, prompts, images, or words used to elicit knowledge. 
Application of intuitive knowledge might also depend on whether intuitions are 
intentionally and explicitly mentioned, and if so, whether they are put in a positive 
or negative light.  
This brief discussion will not likely put to rest debates about the coherence 
of misconceived scientific knowledge. However, the definition of scientific intuition 
I have offered attempts to reconcile common qualities of the mental entities that 
have been theorized to account for conceptual change. Whether we are talking 
about p-prims, facets, ontological categories, epistemological presuppositions, or 
flawed mental models, these cognitive elements are (a) gained early and through 
experience, (b) reside largely outside of conscious reflection, and (c) are robust to 
change from singular experiences that conflict with them. 
In this chapter, I reviewed past and recent conceptual change literature, 
describing the implicit knowledge structures (core knowledge, ontological 
categories, epistemological beliefs, p-prims) various models suggest are involved 
in conceptual change. These knowledge structures can be classified under a more 
general category of knowledge, defined as scientific intuitions. Scientific intuitions 
are general assumptions and heuristics, gained through experience, that are 
unconsciously applied to predict and explain scientific phenomena. To better 
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understand how scientific intuition develops and changes, Chapter 2 describes 
research on implicit learning. 
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Chapter 2: Implicit Learning as a Source of   
Scientific Intuitions 
 
 This dissertation research is based on the claim that implicit learning–the 
acquisition of complex knowledge in the absence of intention or awareness—plays 
an important role in the development of scientific knowledge. In the previous 
chapter, I described the implicit knowledge structures previous models of 
conceptual change rely on to explain students’ difficulties in learning science. In 
this chapter, I discuss how theory and research on implicit learning may provide 
insight into cognitive processes associated with these implicit knowledge 
structures. Specifically, I argue that implicit learning processes are a source of 
scientific intuitions, as previously defined. I begin by providing an overview of 
implicit learning research. Then, I discuss connections between implicit learning 
and scientific knowledge by providing evidence from developmental psychology, 
cognitive psychology, and conceptual change research. I conclude by arguing that 
implicit learning processes play a critical role in the development of scientific 
intuitions important for conceptual change. 
 
A Brief Review of Implicit Learning 
Implicit learning (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 
1998; Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994; Shanks 2004) refers 
to the acquisition of knowledge in the absence of intention and lack of awareness 
of the knowledge learned. Over the past 5 decades, research has demonstrated 
that people, over a range of tasks, have the ability to learn complex patterns in an 
incidental manner. Several aspects of implicit learning have been studied, qualities 
of implicit learning that differentiate it from explicit learning, cognitive models of 
implicit learning, and psychometric qualities and neural bases of implicit learning 
abilities. 
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Qualities of implicit learning tasks 
Reber (1967) coined the term ‘implicit learning’ to describe participants’ 
performance on an artificial grammar task. In an artificial grammar (AG) task, 
strings of letters generated from a set of rules (often represented by a Markov 
chain) are presented with the instruction to simply remember as many letter strings 
as possible. Later, participants are tested on their ability to discriminate between 
novel grammatical and non-grammatical letter strings. Results from studies show 
that participants are able to accurately classify letter strings above chance; 
however, participants are not able to accurately describe the underlying rules of 
the grammar. Thus, the learning that occurs in these tasks is implicit in the sense 
that performance on novel tasks improves in the absence of conscious knowledge 
of what informs performance. 
Similar results have been found across a range of tasks. In sequence 
learning, or serial reaction time (SRT) tasks (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), a target, 
such as a dot, is presented in one of several locations; the subject’s task is to 
respond to the dot location by pressing the corresponding key as quickly as 
possible. Unbeknownst to the subject, the sequence of locations follows a complex 
pattern (e.g. repeating 10-unit long sequence). Reaction times for locating the 
target decrease over several training sessions of the sequence; when a random 
sequence of target locations is introduced, the reaction times significantly increase, 
demonstrating that learning of the structured sequence occurred. However, when 
probed about the sequences of locations, participants cannot reliably report the 
patterns used to improve performance. Variations in the SRT tasks include 
manipulations to the structure of sequences (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990), 
alternating between sequenced and random locations (e.g. ASRT, Howard & 
Howard, 2001), addition of a secondary task to divert attention and memory (e.g. 
Shanks & Johnstone, 1999), and variation in probes for explicit knowledge of the 
learned patterns (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). 
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Figure 2.1. A Markov Chain representation of rules governing a finite-state artificial 
grammar. Examples of grammatical letter strings generated by artificial grammar 
rules. (Figures originally from Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980) 
 
In process control tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1984), participants attempt to 
control the output a system by manipulating the inputs to that system. For example, 
in the sugar factory task, participants take on the role of a plant manager that 
changes the number of workers in order to achieve a certain output of sugar. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the underlying algorithm that follows a function 
dependent on the previous output. Participants are able to maintain the target level 
of output, despite inability to describe the rules used to achieve that output.  
Probabilistic classifications tasks, such as the “weather prediction task,” 
require participants to make predictions between two classes (e.g. “rainy” or 
“sunny”) based on multiple stimuli (Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994). For example, 
each combination of one, two, or three stimuli cards containing different geometric 
shapes produce one condition or another in a probabilistic manner. If two of the 
cues were present, they might result in “rainy” weather 18% of the time. Knowlton 
and colleagues (1994) found that amnesiac patients were able to associate cues 
with outcomes at the same rate as control subjects. Further, learning could not be 
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explained by cue-response information being held in short-term memory, 
suggesting that performance improves based on long-term, non-declarative 
memory. Thus, implicit learning is preserved in patients with damage to brain areas 
associated with explicit, declarative learning. 
The various tasks used to study implicit learning share several features in 
common. First, stimuli are governed by an underlying complex set of rules or 
sequences. The rules or sequences are complex in that rules involve multiple 
operations (e.g. Markov chain) and sequences involve associations of 3 or more 
stimuli. Thus, it is difficult for participants to deduce the governing rules or 
sequences through explicitly searching or testing. Second, evidence for implicit 
learning comes from participants’ performance, measured by changes in accuracy 
and reaction times to stimuli. Increases in accuracy above chance and lower 
reaction times across trials indicate implicit learning. Third, task protocols probe 
explicit knowledge through direct assessment, think-aloud procedures, or other 
declarative explanations. Lack of ability to describe the patterns governing the cue-
response patterns provides additional evidence for implicit learning. 
Research has focused on determining whether implicit learning can be 
distinguished from explicit forms of learning (for reviews, see Frensch & Rünger, 
2003; Seger, 1994; Shanks, 2004). Implicit learning can be qualitatively 
differentiated from explicit learning in several ways. Explicit learning processes 
have been characterized as similar to conscious problem solving, which involves 
building and testing hypotheses and mental models (Mathews et al., 1989). Explicit 
learning processes are slow, controlled, require higher effort, and can process a 
relatively limited amount of information. On the other hand, the processing involved 
in implicit learning is characterized as automatic, rapid, associative, probabilistic, 
requiring low effort, and with a high capacity for information processing (Evans, 
2008).  
In addition to these broad qualitative differences, three aspects of implicit 
learning have been used to operationalize differences with explicit learning: lack 
of intention, lack of awareness, and lack of attention. First, implicit learning can be 
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characterized by lack of intention to learn the targeted information. This is often 
operationalized by varying the instructions and goals given during experimental 
tasks. Typical implicit learning protocols guide participants to memorize a set of 
letter strings (artificial grammar task – Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980), 
respond as quickly as possible to an object location (serial reaction time task – 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), or attempt to maintain a particular output (process 
control task – Berry & Broadbent, 1984). Learning instructions for the same tasks 
can be made more explicit in at least two ways: by instructing participants to seek 
the underlying rule or pattern that governs the display or system (e.g. rule-finding 
or hypothesis-testing) or by presenting explicit information about or 
representations of the rules or patterns that govern the system prior to observation 
of exemplars. For example, in study conducted with older (age = 60-80) and 
younger (age = 20-23) populations, researchers manipulated whether or not task 
goals directed people to look for a rule governing an artificial grammar (Howard & 
Howard, 2001). The results of the study showed that explicit task instructions can 
negatively influence performance in older, but not younger, populations, 
suggesting that lack of intention can be beneficial for learning under some 
conditions.  
Second, participants typically lack awareness of what they have learned 
during an implicit learning task. Researchers operationalize lack of awareness by 
comparing changes in performance and explicit, declarative knowledge. In implicit 
learning tasks, performance typically improves (i.e. higher accuracy and/or lower 
reaction time) despite a lack of a parallel increase in explicit, verbalizable 
knowledge during implicit learning tasks (Seger, 1994). Conscious access or 
awareness of knowledge (or lack thereof) is assessed through verbal reports, 
forced-choice recognition, or subjective recognition ratings performed during 
implicit learning tasks (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998). Although 
researchers do not agree on whether entirely nonconscious knowledge exists (e.g. 
Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Perruchet & Vinter, 1997; Shanks & St. John, 1994), 
there remains a sense that a gap exists between what is learned and awareness 
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of what is learned during implicit learning tasks. This “performance/verbalizable 
knowledge” gap (Berry & Broadbent, 1984) has generated extensive writing and 
empirical studies of implicit and explicit modes of learning, even though this 
distinction has largely drawn attention away from the mechanisms responsible for 
implicit learning (Frensch & Rünger, 2003).  
Third, implicit learning has been characterized in terms of lack of attention. 
To examine the role of attention in implicit learning, researchers have employed 
secondary distracter tasks that divert attention away from implicit learning stimuli. 
For example, Nissen & Bullemer (1987) used a secondary tone-counting task to 
show that sequence learning is reduced when attention is diverted, suggesting 
some form of attention is necessary for learning to occur. However, other studies 
have shown that learning occurs despite diverted attention (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 
1990; Jiang & Chun, 2001; Seger, 1994; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). For 
example, in a visual search task, participants look for a target (a horizontal ‘T’ 
pointing left or right) among distractors (rotated black ‘L’s), responding by 
indicating the direction the bottom of the ‘T’ is pointing. People are able to learn 
associations between the background stimuli (global context) associated with 
target locations to facilitate search; this is known as contextual cueing (Chun & 
Jiang, 1998). When multiple contexts are presented (i.e. black and white 
distractors), both attended and ignored contexts can facilitate visual search. 
However, the expression of this learning depends on how attention is focused 
during transfer tasks (Jiang & Leung, 2005). Thus, while the expression of implicit 
learning demonstrated in contextual cueing requires some form of attention, latent 
learning may occur in the absence of attention.   
To summarize, implicit learning describes learning that occurs despite (1) 
lack of intention to learn (as operationalized by task instructions), (2) lack of 
awareness of what has been learned (shown by inability to consciously access 
knowledge), and (3) reduced attention to stimuli during learning (operationalized 
by employing secondary tasks). In addition to these general qualities of implicit 
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learning, research has also focused on establishing the independence of implicit 
learning by providing evidence from psychometric and neuroimaging data. 
 
Implicit learning as a distinct cognitive ability  
Implicit learning ability can be distinguished from explicit abilities based on 
how its psychometric properties relate to individual differences in other cognitive 
abilities and traits. For example, psychometric intelligence (g) dissociates implicit 
and explicit learning performance, with implicit learning uncorrelated with 
intelligence (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007). Similarly, Kaufman and colleagues 
(2010) found that implicit learning ability is weakly correlated with general 
intelligence and unrelated to working memory ability. On the other hand, implicit 
learning ability measured by the SRT task is correlated with personality traits such 
as openness and impulsivity. Further, compared to explicit reasoning and problem-
solving abilities, there is less variation in implicit learning ability in the population 
and across ages (Howard & Howard, 2001; Frensch & Rünger, 2003). While these 
distinct psychometric qualities of implicit learning provide evidence of separate 
learning mechanisms for implicit and explicit learning, it is possible that there are 
multiple implicit learning abilities exist, as measures of different implicit learning 
tasks are not strongly correlated with one another (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007). 
Research in cognitive neuroscience also suggests dissociation between 
implicit and explicit learning processes. Reber (1993) proposed that implicit 
learning systems developed earlier evolutionarily than explicit systems, predicting 
that implicit learning abilities would be preserved in patients with amnesia caused 
by damage to the medial temporal lobe. Studies of amnesiac patients have shown 
that they do in fact retain implicit learning abilities, despite inability to form new 
declarative memories associated with explicit learning (Knowlton, Rasmus, & 
Squire, 1992; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Further, recent brain imaging studies 
suggest that brain networks important for implicit learning are distinct from 
networks associated with explicit learning (Karabanov et al., 2010; Poldrack et al., 
2001; Seger, Prabhakaran, Poldrack, & Gabrieli, 2000; Yang & Li, 2012). Taken 
  
37 
together, these findings suggest that implicit and explicit learning rely on different 
cognitive mechanisms.  
To summarize, implicit learning can be thought of as an unintentional, 
domain-general mechanism capable of gleaning complex information about 
patterns and sequences in perceptual stimuli that is not readily available to 
conscious report. This ability is differentiated from explicit forms of thinking in that 
it is dissociable from psychometric intelligence (g) and working memory ability, and 
may be supported by distinct brain networks. Although mounting evidence from 
psychometric and neuroimaging research supports implicit and explicit learning as 
separate abilities, ongoing debates about the relationship between implicit 
learning, explicit learning, and awareness (see Frensch & Rünger, 2003) highlight 
the lack of understanding about the cognitive mechanisms that support implicit 
learning. One key issue for implicit learning research is determining whether 
multiple, separate cognitive mechanisms are responsible for implicit and non-
implicit learning, or if a single, shared mechanism generates knowledge both in 
and out of awareness. In the following section, I describe two possible cognitive 
mechanisms to account for implicit learning phenomena. 
 
Cognitive models of implicit learning 
To explain the ability of people to learn structural contingencies without 
intention, awareness, and attention across complex visual and auditory stimuli, 
researchers have developed models of the cognitive processes underlying implicit 
learning phenomena (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) argue that implicit learning can be accounted for by 
the formation of knowledge fragments or “chunks” of associations between 
sequential or co-occurring stimuli. For example, people develop conscious 
knowledge of parts of a complex sequence (e.g. ‘T is followed by S’), rather than 
an unconscious representation of the underlying structure. In an artificial grammar 
task, people were able to recognize grammatical pairs of letters that are 
grammatical (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990), and this knowledge is sufficient to 
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account for performance on a standard test of grammaticality. This “chunking” view 
of implicit learning suggests that implicit learning isn’t unconsciously held. Rather, 
minds are able to develop “chunks” of information about statistical regularities in 
stimuli in memory. As these chunks become more discrete over time, people are 
better able to report them consciously. Further support for this model comes from 
studies that show that learning in an implicit learning task (SRT) is associated with 
working memory capacity when the response-to-stimuli interval (RSI) is 
lengthened to 300 ms (Martini, Furtner, & Sachse, 2013). Thus, implicit learning in 
some circumstances may involve holding information in conscious memory. 
Others have modeled cognitive processes involved in implicit learning using 
computational models, such as connectionist or parallel distributed process (PDP) 
computational models (Davies, 1995; Rumelhart, Hinton, & McClelland, 1986). 
These models propose that information is processed by networks of processing 
units that are activated and inhibited according to simple calculation rules for 
propagation, activation, and learning. Unit activations and connections are able to 
capture information and “learn” about the underlying structure of the environment. 
Rather than occurring in discrete units or representations, information is widely 
distributed across the processing system, allowing for quick activation from partial 
or ambiguous representations (Kihlstrom, 1987). These computational models 
provide explanation for the qualitative features of implicit learning—fast, 
simultaneous, robust, and automatically activated. While there is currently no 
conclusive evidence for one computational model over another, it is important to 
note that these models can distinguish implicit learning processes from more 
explicit, conscious processes. 
Taken together, these findings from psychology, psychometrics, 
neuroscience, and cognitive psychology provide evidence for qualitative and 
quantitative differences between implicit and explicit learning. Implicit learning can 
be thought of as a domain-general cognitive process that gleans complex patterns 
and sequences from perceptual stimuli; this information is activated automatically, 
yet is not readily accessible by conscious report. Implicit learning ability is 
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differentiated from explicit forms of thinking and is dissociable from psychometric 
intelligence (g) and working memory ability, and may be supported by distinct brain 
networks. Cognitive models account for implicit learning phenomena based on 
models of attention, working memory, and computational models. Having 
established evidence for distinct implicit learning processes in human cognition, I 
continue by exploring evidence that implicit learning is involved in the development 
of scientific knowledge. 
 
Implicit Learning as a Source of Scientific Intuitions 
 What evidence do we have that implicit learning processes are involved in 
the development of scientific knowledge? While it should be made clear that I do 
not suggest that all knowledge of scientific phenomena is implicitly learned, there 
is an evidence that it does play a significant role. My interest lies in describing how 
pre-instructional cognitive artifacts proposed by conceptual change theorists, such 
as epistemological commitments, ontological categories, and p-prims, can be 
acquired and changed via implicit learning processes. In this section, I present 
evidence to support the claim that the scientific intuitions important for conceptual 
change originate from implicit processes. 
 First, the presence of implicit science knowledge early in life suggests that 
intuitions may be acquired through implicit learning. As early as infancy, humans 
demonstrate knowledge about the causal rules that govern the physical world and 
show novelty responses for events that appear to violate those rules (Baillargeon, 
1995, 2002; Keil, 2011; Spelke, 1990, 1991). For example, Newman and 
colleagues (2008) presented 7-month-old infants with collisions between two balls 
(i.e. Michotte collisions), observing looking behaviors for physically possible and 
impossible events. Results of several experiments showed that infants look longer 
at impossible causal events (delay between collision and motion) than at possible 
causal (no delay between collision and motion) after being habituated to various 
types of causal events. The authors concluded from several experiments 
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manipulating the temporal delays and complexity of displays that infants are able 
to perceive causality in these events (Newman et al., 2008).  
 The ability to perceive causality develops early, this knowledge does not 
likely develop through explicit, conscious cognitive processes. While some 
developmental psychologists suggest that children engage in sophisticated theory 
testing (e.g. Gopnik, 1996), the cognitive mechanisms and brain areas associated 
with conscious problem solving do not develop until late childhood, extending into 
adolescence (Zelazo, 2004; Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008; Zelazo, Craik, & 
Booth, 2004). For example, when presented with a simple task-switching paradigm 
(i.e., the Dimensional Change Card Sort), 3-year-olds tend to perseverate on a 
previous rule (e.g. ‘match objects based on shape’) after they have been told to 
switch to a new rule (e.g. ‘match objects based on color’). That is, young children 
lack the ability to encode multiple rules to the same stimulus (Zelazo, 2004). Thus, 
the ability to see the same thing from multiple perspectives, a critical skill for 
scientific reasoning and hypothesis testing, is not available early in life. On the 
other hand, researcher have theorized that implicit learning mechanisms develop 
early (in both ontogeny and phylogeny) and require low-level selective attention, 
as opposed to effortful, systematic experimentation (Reber, 1989). Thus, the 
presence of sophisticated science knowledge early in life may not reflect conscious 
problem solving, but rather implicit learning of environmental regularities that 
correspond to scientific concepts.  
Children’s implicit knowledge of causal physical laws may reflect their lack 
of ability to differentiate between improbable and impossible events. For example, 
Shtulman & Carey (2007) presented stories about events that were possible (e.g. 
eating an apple, building a house out of bricks), impossible (e.g. turning 
applesauce back into apples, walking through a brick wall), and improbable (e.g. 
drinking onion juice, making a mug-shaped building). Stories were designed to 
include events that violated physical laws. Children and adults were asked to 
classify events as possible, impossible, or improbable, as well as providing 
reasoning for their answers. The results showed a developmental trend, where 
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adults were more likely to differentiate between impossible and improbable events, 
while younger children were less likely to make this differentiation. That is, 4-year-
olds do not readily differentiate between events that are physically impossible and 
events that are simply unlikely to happen.  
Further, when children report about the causes of events, they are less likely 
than adults to refer to physical laws or facts in their justifications (Shtulman & 
Carey, 2007). Rather, they often provide redundant (“that is impossible”) or 
hypothetical (“something else would happen instead”) justifications for their 
judgments. Even though children can differentiate between possible and 
impossible events, this may reflect their knowledge of the probability of events in 
the world rather than knowledge of the mechanisms by which they can or cannot 
occur. This also suggests that the information that people learn about the world is 
probabilistic, rather than deterministic, in nature. One explanation for this 
observation is that early learning is implicit in nature, leading to knowledge that is 
statistical in nature (Perruchet & Pacton, 2006). 
While it should be noted that there is considerable debate about whether 
knowledge about perceptual causality is innate or learned (see Cohen & Oakes, 
1993; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes & Cohen, 1990), the relevant conclusions from 
this research are (a) implicit knowledge of causality in physical events appears 
early in life, and (b) this knowledge is not dependent on explicit, conscious 
reasoning abilities. This evidence supports the claim that implicit scientific 
knowledge can develop in the absence of mature, conscious thinking abilities 
associated with scientific reasoning, such as logical reasoning, symbolic 
representation, and abstract thought. 
A second piece of evidence for implicit learning in science comes from 
conceptual change literature in the characterizations of the prior knowledge 
structures involved in models of science learning. These descriptions share many 
qualities of implicitly-learned knowledge – they occur in the absence of awareness 
and intention to learn. For example, in describing the development of p-prims, 
diSessa (1993) states that they “often originate as minimal abstractions of common 
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phenomena” (p. 114). Later, he states, “I presume that conscious access to their 
application is very limited … Subjects may make predictions on the basis of a p-
prim, but the prediction is not the p-prim” (p. 119). Thus p-prims, as described, 
exist in the absence of awareness of what has been learned or applied. Sodian, 
Zaichik, & Carey (1991) provide a further statement of lack of awareness of early 
scientific knowledge: “…while young children may construct intuitive theories of 
the world, they lack metaconceptual awareness of this fact” (p. 753). This 
difference between naïve knowledge and scientific is emphasized again by 
Vosniadou: “children are usually not metaconceptually aware of their beliefs…” (p. 
122). Similarly, Chi (2005) in describing how ontological classes are learned says 
that they can be easily learned because “the shared features are often perceptually 
salient and can be intuitively grasped as similar … without the need of being told” 
(p. 177). That is, scientific knowledge about ontological classes can be acquired in 
the lack of intention and effort. In a recent example, researchers studying intuitive 
biological knowledge described what they call “cognitive construal” as being tied 
misconceptions about evolution (Coley & Tanner, 2015). According to these 
researchers, “[a] cognitive construal is an intuitive, often implicit, way of thinking 
about the world” (Coley, Arenson, Xu, & Tanner, 2017, p. 2).  
Taken together, researchers have proposed and described different types 
of mental structures of prior scientific knowledge, and this knowledge shares many 
qualities with the knowledge that is gained through implicit learning. This 
knowledge is held largely in the absence of awareness and is automatically 
activated. What is missing from these descriptions is how these mental structures 
are acquired. While I acknowledge the possibility of innate mental structures, one 
goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that these types of structures can be 
learned through implicit learning techniques. I continue to develop this case in the 
next chapter, which offers strategies for applying implicit learning to science 
learning. 
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Chapter 3: Using Implicit Learning to Enhance 
Conceptual Change Instruction 
 
Several decades of research in science instruction have led to the 
conclusion that conceptual change is a slow, effortful process (Carey, 2000; Chi, 
Slotta, & deLeeuw, 1994; diSessa, 1982; Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993; 
Özdemir & Clark, 2007; Smith & Carey, 1985; Vosniadou, 1994). The instructional 
approaches used to encourage conceptual change processes have been largely 
explicit and intentional in nature (e.g. Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003). Before describing 
how implicit learning can be utilized to address conceptual change in science, I 
discuss some of the challenges of explicit forms of instruction in inducing 
conceptual change, particularly in relation to the notion of cognitive conflict. Then, 
I offer examples and principles for applying implicit learning to conceptual change 
in science.  
 
Challenges of Explicit Instruction for Conceptual Change 
Explicit instruction involves the direct presentation of concepts, 
explanations, and arguments to the learner as declarative knowledge, theories, or 
model representations. Explicit instruction, like direct instruction, can be an 
effective method to teach complex ideas, avoiding incorrect feedback and 
encoding errors that may lead to ambiguous knowledge structures (Klahr & Nigam, 
2004). For example, learning science researchers have found that direct 
instruction delivered via cognitive tutors can be an efficient way to teach algebra, 
geometry, and some scientific reasoning strategies (Koedinger & Anderson, 1997; 
Sao Pedro, Gobert, Heffernan, & Beck, 2009). Science concepts can be presented 
explicitly through a variety of media, including text, teacher talk, demonstrations, 
and video. Although seemingly straightforward, there are several reasons why 
explicit instructional methods may be ineffective. 
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First, scientific representations used to instruct students explicitly may be 
scientifically inaccurate or obtuse. Irrelevant details can lead to reduced learning, 
especially when extraneous information is interesting to the learner (Mayer, 
Griffith, Jurkowitz, & Rothman, 2008). Further, these representations can actually 
be a source of misconceptions if they are unclear or lack coherence (Goldman & 
Bisanz, 2002). Even when learners are given representations that are scientifically 
accurate and concise, these depictions may not be fully comprehended in light of 
naïve knowledge structures because the learner lacks requisite knowledge for 
understanding new or conflicting information. 
Attempts to explicitly correct inaccurate information may also backfire. 
Studies on political and health misperceptions have attempted to explicitly correct 
people’s incorrect beliefs by presenting them as “myths.” Remarkably, these 
attempts can result in increased acceptance of wrong information (Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). Because explicit corrective 
messages must be recalled to memory, people with lower ability to recall facts 
(such as novices, young and elderly people) are more susceptible to these so-
called backfire effects (Ecker, Swire, & Lewandowsky, 2014).  
One widely-studied strategy of explicit instruction for conceptual change is 
the use of refutation texts (for reviews, see Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 
1993; Tippett, 2010). In this method, a learner reads text in which a common 
misconception is explicitly presented (e.g. “Many people believe…”). This is 
followed by a refutation cue statement (e.g. “However, this is not scientifically 
correct”), which is then followed by a scientific explanation. Researchers have 
examined how activation of prior knowledge, text format and structure, and reading 
processes and strategies influence conceptual change. While research has shown 
that refutation texts are generally effective, their effectiveness may be influenced 
by the grain size of the knowledge representations being addressed. For example, 
Chi (2008) suggests that while refutation texts may be effective for changing single 
faulty ideas, they may not be sufficient for addressing more robust, flawed mental 
models and categories.  
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Explicit instructional strategies, such as refutation text, depend on the 
successful activation and coordination of multiple cognitive resources and 
processes. First, learners must encode a refutation cue (e.g. “Some people hold 
the incorrect belief that…”). This cue is intended to activate prior knowledge, and 
signals to the learner that the information to follow is scientifically incorrect 
(Alvermann & Hague, 1989; Guzzetti, 2000). Accurate information must then be 
presented in a manner that is understandable, credible, and useful (Mason & 
Gava, 2007). According to the co-activation hypothesis (Kendeou & van den 
Broek, 2007), it is critical that scientifically accurate information is co-activated with 
previous inaccurate knowledge in working memory. This co-activation can lead to 
cognitive conflict, which produces additional processing and increases the 
likelihood of knowledge revision (Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014). Because each aspect 
of explicit conceptual change instruction relies on attention and working memory 
resources, these techniques are likely to fail when cognitive resources are limited 
due to lack of ability, experience, time, or a combination of these factors. 
Further, explicit instruction techniques rely on the assumption that learners 
are rational thinkers. That is, given the appropriate information, learners are 
expected to make rational decisions about what is correct and what is incorrect. 
Research on the psychology of decision-making has shown that under various 
conditions, people are not rational and make decisions that are systematically 
biased (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1983). 
For example, studies on the framing effect demonstrate that people react 
differently to choices that are logically equivalent when those choices are framed 
positively or negatively (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Druckman, 2001). 
Explicit conceptual change instruction has been shown to be effective when 
naïve scientific ideas occur at a relatively small conceptual grain size (Guzzetti, 
Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993; Tippett, 2010). For example, refutation texts can 
effectively correct single incorrect ideas such as “the heart oxygenates blood” or 
“camels store water in their humps” or “the North Star (Polaris) is the brightest in 
the night sky.” However, naïve ideas in science often occur at a larger grain size, 
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caused by a flawed mental model or mistakes in the categorization of concepts 
(Chi, 2008). While a mistaken belief or set of beliefs can be explicitly demonstrated, 
making learners aware of categorical errors is difficult to achieve explicitly. For 
example, it is not easy to put into words why electricity flowing through a wire is 
not like water flowing through a pipe. While there are many perceptual similarities, 
applying the properties of one to the other would lead to incorrect predictions and 
mistaken beliefs. Critically, learners must become aware of these category 
mistakes before they can build new conceptual structures to accommodate 
scientific phenomena (Chi, 2008). Thus, explicit instructional methods may be 
inadequate for making learners aware of the conflict between their prior knowledge 
and scientific concepts when they conflict at a categorical level. Although 
conceptual change via explicit and intentional instruction can be effective in some 
cases, other strategies are needed for learning contexts where students have 
limited cognitive tools and resources, or when learning involves more complex 
knowledge structures.  
 
The role of cognitive conflict in conceptual change 
Conceptual change researchers have long theorized that cognitive conflict 
plays a critical role early in conceptual change processes (Hewson & Hewson, 
1990; Posner et al., 1982; Strike & Posner, 1992; Ramsburg & Ohlsson, 2016; for 
review, see Limón, 2001). Posner and colleagues (1982) proposed that the first 
stage of conceptual change involves dissatisfaction with current conceptions. 
Cognitive conflict is the basis for instructional techniques such as refutation texts 
(Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993) and discrepant events (Fensham & 
Kass, 1988). Discrepant events (along with related strategies such as presenting 
counterintuitive evidence and invoking prediction errors) are learning situations 
designed to demonstrate inconsistencies between the ways students perceive or 
think about the world and the scientific concept that they are intended to learn. The 
results of studies on the effectiveness of cognitive conflict strategies are mixed; 
while some research supports the effectiveness of these techniques, other 
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research shows that they can be ineffective, and worse detrimental, to student 
learning. Further, there is a lack of understanding of the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms involved in cognitive conflict and how they support conceptual 
change in science education. 
Some research studies have supported the cognitive conflict strategy as 
effective for inducing conceptual change. For example, Kang, Scharmann, & Noh 
(2004) showed middle school students a series of discrepant events—
demonstrations that provide novel experiences and outcomes that contradict prior 
intuitions about scientific phenomena. Then, students engaged in a computer-
based instructional activity, which served as a conceptual change intervention. By 
assessing the degree of conceptual conflict during these demonstrations and the 
change in students’ conceptual knowledge afterward, researchers concluded that 
increased conceptual conflict was associated with increased conceptual 
knowledge.  
 However, other studies have shown mixed results associated with cognitive 
conflict. For example, Dreyfus, Jungwirth, & Eliovitch (1990) introduced conceptual 
conflict during interviews with 16-year-old students about common intuitions about 
scientific topics. Although they found evidence suggesting cognitive conflict 
occurred, students failed to achieve meaningful conflict. That is, students 
experienced conflict between their prior knowledge and scientific explanations, but 
were unable to make sense of the reasons for the conflict. The inability of learners 
to achieve meaningful conflict has been found in other studies (Chan, Burtis, 
Bereiter, 1997), and is in line with findings that students facing anomalous data 
demonstrate many different responses that do not lead to conceptual change, such 
as ignoring, rejection, uncertainty, exclusion, abeyance, and reinterpretation 
(Chinn & Brewer, 1998). Lack of meaningful conflict reduces the likelihood that this 
conflict will be appropriately resolved and result in conceptual change will occur 
(Limón, 2001). 
 A further problem of with conceptual conflict approaches is that they may 
only result in superficial changing of concepts. In a study of 9th grade Korean 
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students, Lee and Byun (2012) found that the most common response to cognitive 
conflict was what they called “superficial theory change” in which students 
accepted the anomalous data as valid, abandoned their prior knowledge, but were 
unable to provide an explanation for the data. Students that have undergone 
“superficial theory change” may appear to have changed their conceptions in 
written and verbal reports, but lack understanding of the underlying scientific 
concept. The researchers also measured aspects of cognitive conflict–recognition, 
interest, anxiety, and reappraisal. They found that anxiety was critical component 
of cognitive conflict, and that higher levels of anxiety reduced the effect of cognitive 
conflict on student learning. Thus, conceptual conflict may also have the 
unintended effect of causing anxiety among students, which in turn can have a 
negative impact on learning. 
 Researchers have also demonstrated that conceptual change can occur in 
the absence of conceptual conflict. Ramsburg & Ohlsson (2016) developed a 
categorization task to examine non-monotonic learning of a category. Participants 
were trained to categorize images of fictional bacteria (i.e. whether it is oxygen-
resistant or not) using information about 6 different characteristics (e.g., nuclei, cell 
wall, ribosome shape), each with two possible levels. They initially learned to 
categorize based on a misconception feature (i.e. black nuclei). After initial 
learning, the feature determining category membership changed to a new target 
feature (i.e. “bent ribosomes”). This target learning occurred either with or without 
disconfirming evidence. That is, half of participants received feedback that 
contradicted their previous categorization (complete condition) and half received 
only feedback confirming the new feature association (confirmation-only 
condition). The results showed that participants in the confirmation-only condition 
not only learned the new category, they learned it faster than those that received 
disconfirming evidence. The authors of the study concluded that at least one form 
of conceptual change, category change, is possible in the absence of cognitive 
conflict. 
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 Taken together, research on cognitive conflict brings into question its 
relevance in conceptual change processes. While it has been proposed as a 
valuable method for addressing prior, inaccurate knowledge about scientific 
phenomena, the value of cognitive conflict as a general strategy has not been well-
established. One particular challenge of this strategy is that explicit refutation or 
falsification of prior knowledge may have negative effects on learning—refuting a 
previous belief can unintentionally reinforce inaccurate beliefs and information that 
falsifies prior concepts can impede learning of the new concepts. Further, 
conceptual conflict strategies may not be helpful for all students. Researchers have 
suggested that while cognitive conflict may be beneficial for students with high 
academic achievement backgrounds, it may hinder learning for low-achieving 
students (Limón, 2001; Zohar & Aharon-Kravetsky, 2005).  
If there is a role for cognitive conflict in conceptual change, it is possible that 
the amount of cognitive conflict is important. As described above, high levels of 
conflict may hinder conceptual change. This raises the possibility that smaller 
degrees of conflict that do not involve overtly rejecting inaccurate beliefs (such as 
in refutation texts) or presenting falsifying information (such as in discrepant 
events), may be more effective in inducing conceptual change. Research on 
implicit learning offers important insights into how these processes can be 
leveraged for conceptual change in science learning. In particular, I continue by 
discussing how implicit learning can help understand the role of cognitive conflict 
in conceptual change. 
 
Implications of Implicit Learning Research for Conceptual Change 
Research on implicit learning provides key insights into how and why this 
form of learning can enhance conceptual change processes through indirect 
conceptual conflict. Evidence comes from two types of implicit learning studies: (1) 
experiments examining how implicit learning interacts with prior knowledge, and 
(2) experiments that examine how implicit learning tasks can lead to the 
development of explicit, conscious knowledge offer key insights. 
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Researchers have found that violating expectations based on prior general 
knowledge can enhance implicit learning. Ziori, Pathos, and Dienes (2014) 
modified an artificial grammar (AG) implicit learning task to incorporate familiar 
geographical information. The letters strings commonly used in AG tasks were 
changed to represent flight routes between European cities. The researchers 
manipulated whether the strings were congruent or incongruent with prior 
knowledge about distances between cities. Results of the study showed that 
participants learned more about the artificial grammar structure and applied more 
prior general knowledge when AG strings violated expectations based on prior 
knowledge. 
Implicit learning research also shows that learners can develop explicit 
knowledge about complex phenomena, such as artificial grammars and complex 
sequences, when implicitly learned expectations are violated systematically. In a 
study employing complex sequences, Rünger and Frensch (2008) found that 
learners are more likely to be able to report what they have learned in an implicit 
learning task when they are presented with stimuli that follow a different rule or 
sequence (as opposed to no rule or a random sequence). Thus, providing stimuli 
that are incongruent with prior knowledge can lead to explicit knowledge about 
complex phenomena.  
These results have important implications for conceptual change in science 
learning. First, a typical problem with inducing cognitive conflict is that learners are 
unaware of their implicit ideas (Limón, 2001). Therefore, learners may lack 
metacognitive awareness of their prior ideas, making it difficult to demonstrate 
conflict and induce suppression. Second, learners must be able gather information 
about new, scientifically accurate structures when their expectations are violated. 
The findings from implicit learning research suggest that implicit learning tasks may 
provide opportunities to bring intuitions into awareness, as well as provide 
opportunities to apply newly-acquired scientific concepts.  
In complex science phenomena, while simple rules can often be used to 
make accurate predictions, novel situations require more sophisticated rules and 
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concepts. Therefore, learners need exposure to novel and varied novel examples 
to develop a mature understanding of how different variables interact. The above 
research suggests that for novices, predictions about difficult cases should occur 
under implicit, rather than explicit, task instructions. That is, the learner’s goal 
should initially be incidental or tangential to the to-be-learned principle or concept. 
Thus, the pursuit of implicit knowledge in difficult tasks may represent a sort of 
desirable difficulty (Bjork & Bjork, 2011) that can enhance later learning and 
performance. 
In addition to informing conceptual change theory and practice, implicit 
learning research offers methodological tools for further investigation. Implicit 
learning tasks such as artificial grammar and process-control tasks provide 
templates in which to investigate implicit learning in science contexts (see 
Zimmerman & Pretz, 2012, for example). Likewise, because implicit learning tasks 
often employ computer-enhanced stimuli and simulations, researchers can gather 
accuracy and reaction time data to make inferences about the cognitive processes 
engaged during science learning. 
 
Developing Implicit Learning Tasks for Science 
 In order to engage students in implicit learning of science concepts, implicit 
learning task paradigms may be adapted for use with scientific phenomena. 
Although implicit learning may involve science concepts that do not typically 
involve misconceptions, this dissertation is particularly interested in describing 
scientific phenomena about which students typically have intuitions. These tasks 
should follow three guidelines: reduce hypothesis-testing strategies, high stimulus 
volume, and bias toward intuitive incongruence. 
 First, implicit science learning tasks should reduce the degree to which 
explicit hypothesis-testing strategies can be employed. That is, tasks should 
encourage learners to make intuitive decisions. There are several ways to 
encourage an intuitive approach. One way is the make tasks speeded; by reducing 
the amount of time learners have to consider stimuli, they are less likely to form 
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conscious rules and gather explicit evidence either confirming or disconfirming 
those rules. Another way is to reduce the amount of information available. For 
example, an implicit learning task about motion and forces might provide sparse 
stimuli without referring explicitly to quantitative variables velocity, mass, friction, 
and time. This encourages learners to “fill in the gaps” with their intuitive 
knowledge. On the other hand, a “crowded” task environment can be used to 
overwhelm perceptual, sensory, and working memory resources. Providing more 
information than can be actively processed reduces the likelihood that explicit 
learning will occur.  
 Second, to capitalize on implicit learning, tasks should expose learners to a 
high volume of stimuli. Unlike explicit learning tasks, implicit learning tasks involve 
experience with numerous stimuli. While there are no published guidelines for the 
number of trials required, research studies typically involve between 25 and 300 
trials during a training block.  
Third, the stimuli employed in implicit science learning tasks should be 
biased toward examples that are incongruent with intuitive knowledge. For 
example, an implicit learning task on the topic of the causes for the seasons on 
Earth might address the intuition that “closer means strong”—an intuition 
commonly used by students to support the misconception that the distance 
between the Sun and Earth is the cause of seasonal temperature differences. To 
address this intuition, the task should provide many examples of winter / cooler 
temperatures occurring when the distance between the Sun and Earth is smaller. 
Biasing tasks towards stimuli that are incongruent with intuitions decreases the 
likelihood that inaccurate prior intuitions will be reinforced by the task.  
 
General Research Problem 
 The research problem this dissertation research addresses is how implicit 
learning can be leveraged to enhance conceptual change in science. In order to 
address this problem, we developed tasks that employ implicit learning, based on 
the three guidelines outlined above, in the context of sinking and floating objects 
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in water. The studies in this research provide three unique contributions to the 
literature on conceptual change. 
First, this study applies implicit learning research to explain conceptual 
change related to why objects sink or float in water. Prior research has shown that 
students have intuitive ideas about the scientific phenomenon of sinking and 
floating objects that influence learning of scientific explanations of density (Kloos, 
Fisher, & Van Orden, 2010; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985). Previous studies have 
been designed to identify and measure younger students’ knowledge of this 
phenomenon (Schneider & Hardy, 2013; Yin, Tomita, & Shavelson, 2008). In 
addition, studies have examined the role of instructional scaffolding (Hardy, Jonen, 
Möller, & Stern, 2006), empirical evidence (Kloos & Somerville, 2001), and 
scientific discourse (Hardy, Kloetzer, Moeller, & Sodian, 2010) on conceptual 
change processes related to sinking and floating. Although previous a previous 
study has addressed how implicit versus explicit processes influence performance 
on a scientific discovery task related to balance beams (Zimmerman & Pretz, 
2013), the role of implicit learning has not been studied in relation to why objects 
sink and float in water. 
 Second, this research employed methods for measuring both implicit, 
intuitive knowledge and explicit, conceptual knowledge of sinking and floating 
objects. Previous studies have examined implicit, intuitive knowledge (i.e. Kloos, 
Fisher, & Van Orden, 2010; Potvin, Masson, Lafortune, & Cyr, 2014) or explicit, 
conceptual knowledge (i.e. Hardy, Kloetzer, Moeller, & Sodain, 2010; Schneider & 
Hardy, 2013), but not both. Examining learning-induced changes in both intuitive 
and conceptual knowledge is important for two reasons. First, mature scientific 
understanding of sinking and floating may be elicited as intuitive or conceptual 
knowledge. For example, conceptual knowledge about sinking and floating may 
be demonstrated when a student reproduces the formula for calculating density 
when interviewed, while intuitive knowledge may be shown when a student applies 
the heuristics “mass > volume, then sink” and “mass < volume, then float” in a 
speeded judgment task. Second, the learning progression related to sinking and 
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floating may involve separate changes in intuitive and conceptual knowledge. For 
example, a person may refine their intuitions about sinking and floating objects by 
relying on material information to make intuitive judgments. While this person’s 
intuitive knowledge has increased, they could continue lack conceptual knowledge 
of density necessary for a scientific explanation of why objects sink or float. 
 Third, the two experiments presented in this dissertation examine the effect 
implicit learning when leveraged alone (Experiment 1), as well as in combination 
with direct instruction (Experiment 2). In doing so, this research acknowledges that 
implicit learning in isolation is not likely to result in conceptual change, at least on 
a relatively short time scale. On the other hand, the changes induced by implicit 
learning may enhance learning when combined with other instructional activities. 
Previous research and theories suggest that combining different learning activities 
can enhance learning. Hypotheses related to specific theories are tested in 
Experiment 2 by sequencing implicit learning tasks either before or after direct 
instruction about density concepts.  
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to examine whether engaging in implicit 
learning tasks can effectively influence people’s intuitive and conceptual 
knowledge related to sinking and floating. Training tasks were manipulated to vary 
the degree to which learning was intentional (i.e., explicit) or incidental (i.e., 
implicit) in nature. Participants were instructed to make predictions about sinking 
and floating objects in either an intuitive manner (i.e. quickly, without thinking too 
much) or an explicit, hypothesis-testing manner. Implicit, intuitive knowledge was 
measured by examining accuracy and reaction time on a prediction task related to 
sinking and floating objects. Explicit, conceptual knowledge was measured 
through assessments designed to elicit misconceptions, reasoning, and 
understanding of concepts relevant to sinking and floating. Experiment 1 also 
explored the relationship between these two types of knowledge. 
A key finding from research on implicit learning is that incidental forms of 
training result in improvements in implicit knowledge without corresponding 
changes in explicit knowledge (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Cleeremans, 
Desdrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Lewicki, 1986; Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994; Shanks, 
2004). Gains in implicit knowledge are indicated by increased prediction accuracy 
(e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 1994; Reber, 1967) or 
faster reaction times (e.g. Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Chun & Jiang, 1998). For the 
sinking and floating predictions task employed in this research, evidence of implicit 
learning is indicated by both changes in accuracy and reaction time. Improvements 
in implicit knowledge in the absence of explicit conceptual knowledge gains may 
indicate small, but critical progress toward scientific understanding and conceptual 
change.  
Experiment 1 examined the implicit nature of prior intuitive knowledge 
related to sinking and floating objects. Previous studies show that intuitive science 
ideas can influence processing speed, even among experts (Goldberg & 
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Thompson-Schill, 2009; Shtulman & Varcarcel, 2012). That is, people with mature 
scientific understanding are slower to respond to stimuli that are incongruent with 
intuitive ideas. The implicit training and assessment tasks used in this research 
were designed to elicit and challenge prior intuitive ideas about sinking and floating 
objects by presenting stimuli congruent and incongruent with common intuitions. 
Differences in accuracy and reaction time for participants’ predictions about 
congruent or incongruent objects provide evidence of the implicit nature of this 
knowledge. The absence of corresponding changes in explicit conceptual 
knowledge related to misconceptions would be further indicates that people can 
learn implicitly about sinking and floating objects. 
Although a considerable amount of conceptual change research on sinking 
and floating objects has been conducted, this is the first experiment, to our 
knowledge, to examine both implicit and explicit knowledge related to this topic. 
By measuring both types of knowledge, this experiment offers several empirical 
insights. First, multiple measures offer a more robust view of people’s science 
knowledge related to sinking and floating. For example, accuracy and reaction time 
measures of implicit knowledge may reveal subtle changes in knowledge that are 
not captured in explicit verbal reports. Second, by comparing individuals’ 
performance on implicit and explicit knowledge measures, we have the opportunity 
to examine the relationship between these types of knowledge. Third, in the 
context of this experiment, it affords the opportunity to examine how different types 
of training affect implicit and explicit knowledge. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The overall goal of Experiment 1 was to examine how implicit learning tasks 
affect implicit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and the relationship between these 
two types of knowledge. Experiment 1 addresses three research questions: 
RQ 1-1. How does implicit learning affect intuitive knowledge related to 
sinking and floating?  
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The first hypothesis regarding intuitive knowledge was that participants 
employ their prior intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating objects to make 
predictions about sinking and floating objects. Prior intuitive knowledge can 
positively or negatively affect prediction accuracy depending on whether it leads 
to predictions that are congruent or incongruent with predictions based on scientific 
concepts (i.e. density and buoyancy). If participants make predictions based on 
intuitive knowledge, we expect to see an effect of congruence on prediction 
performance in the absence of training.  
The second hypothesis was that implicit training would result in gains in 
intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating objects. The effect of training on 
intuitive knowledge was measured in terms of increased accuracy and faster 
reaction times on subsequent predictions about sinking and floating objects. We 
expected that participants in training conditions would make faster and more 
accurate predictions compared to participants that did not receive training. In order 
to show that learning was based on transferrable implicit knowledge about sinking 
and floating objects, and not simply explicit memory for whether particular objects 
sink or float, we compared performance on objects previously presented during 
training and novel objects. We predicted that participants in training groups would 
make more accurate predictions compared to participants without training on both 
old and novel objects. 
The third hypothesis related to this research question was that the effect of 
training on intuitive knowledge depends on the implicit or explicit nature of learning 
during the training task. To test this hypothesis, we manipulated the degree of 
active production during training tasks. Previous research shows that implicit 
learning is modulated by selective attention (Stadler, 1995; Jiang & Chun, 2001). 
We predicted that increasing active production would lead to more accurate 
predictions by increasing attention to relevant information. However, encouraging 
a rule-testing strategy is also likely to result in slower predictions. Participants that 
engage in implicit learning processes (i.e. less active production) during training 
are expected to make faster predictions. 
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RQ 1-2. How does implicit learning affect conceptual knowledge related to 
sinking and floating? 
 We hypothesized that implicit learning would not have a significant effect on 
explicit conceptual knowledge. Several reasons support this hypothesis. First, 
research on implicit learning has demonstrated that implicit knowledge can be 
gained in the absence of explicit knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, 
1967; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Second, although the training tasks were 
designed to elicit and challenge prior intuitive ideas, the brief and speeded nature 
of these tasks made it unlikely participants would discover the density rule without 
prior exposure. Third, any gains in explicit knowledge are likely to be small and 
may not be sufficient for far transfer.  
RQ 1-3. Does training affect the relationship between implicit intuitive 
knowledge and explicit conceptual knowledge? 
 Previous research shows that implicit and explicit knowledge are distinct, 
yet interacting forms of knowledge (Batterink, Reber, Neville, & Paller, 2015; Berry 
& Broadbent, 1988; Green & Flowers, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, 1986; Reber, et al., 
1980). Some researchers argue that implicit and explicit knowledge have a 
positive, synergistic effect on one another (e.g., Mathews, et al. 1989; Rünger & 
Frensch, 2008; Sun, Mathews, & Lane, 2007). For example, Mathews and 
colleagues (1989, Experiment 4) found that implicit and explicit knowledge had a 
synergystic effect on performance on artificial grammar learning task. Other 
researchers have found that these forms of knowledge can interfere with one 
another (e.g., Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, et al., 1980; Ziori, Pothos, & 
Dienes, 2014). For example, people engaging in explicit learning may develop 
explicit knowledge of rules that is wrong or incomplete, leading to poorer 
performance on artificial grammar tasks (Reber, et al., 1980; Experiment 1).  
 We hypothesize that the relationship between performance on implicit and 
explicit knowledge assessments will depend on the degree to which training 
engages explicit knowledge related to sinking and floating objects. For training 
conditions where participants are encouraged to develop and test explicit rules 
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about sinking and floating, their accuracy on sinking and floating predictions is 
expected to be positively correlated with conceptual knowledge. That is, if 
participants make inaccurate sinking and floating predictions based on incorrect 
rules, they will also be likely to demonstrate inaccurate conceptual knowledge. 
However, in training conditions that encourage development of intuitive knowledge 
related to sinking and floating, there is less likely to be a correlation between 
performance on sinking and floating predictions and conceptual knowledge 
performance. This is because in implicit forms of training, implicit knowledge of 
sinking and floating develops independently of explicit conceptual knowledge. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Design  
This study employed a mixed-effects design. The between-subjects factor 
was training condition with 4 levels –explicit training, implicit training, incidental 
training, and no training. For sinking and floating performance, there were two 
within-subject factors—congruence and new/old—with two levels each. In 
addition, the effects of training on explicit conceptual knowledge were explored by 
examining performance on conceptual knowledge assessments. 
 
 
Participants 
 To determine adequate sample sizing for the experimental design, a power 
analysis was conducted, following recommendations from Guo, Logan, Glueck, & 
Muller (2013). Data from a previous study (Wang, Varma, & Varma, 2012) was 
analyzed to estimate variance and effect size inputs. The GLIMMPSE program 
(http://glimmpse.samplesizeshop.org/) was used to calculate sample sizes. Using 
a clustering of 50 trials per participant and an intra-cluster correlation of 0.03, the 
model above was specified for accuracy response data with a mean difference of 
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0.1 among conditions. The analysis employed the Hotelling-Lawley Trace 
statistical test, with a Type I error rate of .05. Variability of within-participant factors 
was estimated at 0.6 and variability across responses was estimated as 0.3. The 
results of the analysis showed that a total sample size of 60, with 15 participants 
in each group would yield power of  = .806. 
Fifty-six participants (M age = 20.3, 48 female) were recruited from the 
University of Minnesota via class announcements and recruitment postings. 
Participants were compensated with course credit or a $10 gift card. Participants 
were tested individually in a lab room. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
The experimental protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
University of Minnesota. 
 
Materials 
Prior knowledge assessment. Before beginning the training phase, each 
participant was asked to answer the following question: “Do you know of a rule, or 
set of rules, that can be used to determine whether an object will sink or float in 
water?” Responses to this question were used to determine baseline knowledge 
about the causes of sinking and floating. This assessment was also used to identify 
participants likely to perform at ceiling across the implicit and explicit knowledge 
assessments. 
Training tasks. In the training task, participants were presented with 
various objects and asked to predict whether each object would sink or float in 
water. The objects varied in material (clay, iron, wax, or wood), shape (cube, 
sphere, tetrahedron, or flat), size (small, medium, large), holes (holes or no holes), 
and hollowness (hollow or not hollow). A picture of the object was presented along 
with an image of a hand or person to provide scale. A table summarizing the 
object’s characteristics appeared along with the picture (see Figure 4.1). This table 
included information about the object’s mass (g) and volume (ml) when 
submerged, allowing participants to calculate and apply the density concept to 
make the predictions (i.e. objects with density greater than the density of water, 1 
  
61 
g/ml, sink, and objects with density less than water float). Participants responded 
by pressing a corresponding button on a keyboard (‘Q’ for sink and ‘P’ for float). 
After each responding, participants were shown a feedback screen for 1500 ms. 
This screen provided feedback on accuracy (green screen with “CORRECT” or red 
screen with “INCORRECT”), as well as response time. 
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Figure 4.1. Example of stimuli presented in training and test trials 
 
Inhibition ability assessments. Inhibitory mechanisms may play an 
important role in suppressing intuitive, incorrect responses and reasoning related 
to science and math concepts (Babai et al., 2012; Foisy et al., 2015; Potvin et al., 
2014). Thus, increased inhibition ability may reduce the effect of training. To 
account for individual differences in inhibition ability, all participants completed two 
assessments of inhibition ability—the Dimensional Change Card Sort task (DCCS; 
Zelazo, 2006) and Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974)—before and after the 
training phase, respectively. In the DCCS, participants sort objects based on a 
shape or color rule, switching between rules throughout the task. In switching 
between rules, participants must inhibit the previous rule and the dimension 
associated with it (i.e. the color or shape of the object). In the Flanker task, 
participants are presented with a row of several arrows and their task is to 
determine the direction the center arrow is pointing (left or right). The stimuli vary 
as to whether the surrounding arrows are in the same or opposite direction of the 
middle arrow. Therefore, when the surrounding arrows are in the opposite 
direction, the task requires inhibition of these stimuli to make an accurate 
response. For each measure, a score is calculated based on accuracy and 
reaction time on target trials (post-switch or incongruent, respectively). Scores 
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from each measure were added together to produce a single inhibition ability 
score. Inhibition ability measures were included as covariates to control for 
individual differences. 
Sinking and floating prediction task. Intuitive knowledge was assessed 
by examining participants’ predictions about sinking and floating objects. The 
presentation of each object was identical to the training phase, except that 
feedback was not provided. During this phase, 28 items had been previously 
presented during training, and 22 were new. Of the old items, 3 were repeated 
during the test, which provided an opportunity to check if participants responded 
consistently across items. Objects were presented in a random order for each 
participant. In contrast to the training phase, no feedback was provided.  
Across both training and test phases, a larger proportion of incongruent 
objects were presented. This was intended to increase the difficulty of the task, as 
well as activate intuitions about sinking and floating objects. Across all trials, 89% 
of trials were congruent with material-based intuitive rules (“wood objects float” 
“iron objects sink”), and 63% of trials were congruent with intuitive rules about size 
(“larger objects sink” “smaller objects float”). For the 23% of trials that were flat-
shaped, the intuitive rule “flat object float” was accurate 46% of trials. For trials that 
included objects with holes (23% of trials), the intuitive rule “objects with holes sink” 
led to accurate predictions 65% of the time. Similarly, the intuitive rule “hollow 
objects float” led to accurate predictions 65% of the time for trials that had hollow 
objects (36% of trials). 
 Conceptual knowledge test. Participants completed an assessment of 
conceptual knowledge related to sinking and floating objects (see Appendix A for 
assessment items). Items were adapted from assessments designed to identify 
students’ misconceptions about sinking and floating (Edelsbrunner, Schalk, 
Schumacher, & Stern, 2015; Yin, Tomita, & Shavelson, 2008). The assessment 
required students to make sinking and floating predictions about objects in various 
scenarios. These items did not require calculation of density. Rather, they were 
designed to elicit misconceptions about sinking and floating objects. For example, 
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two round spheres, one solid and one hollow, are shown together; the objects are 
described as having the same density and that the solid object sinks. The 
participant selected one of the following 3 responses in relation to the hollow 
object: sink, float, or neither sink nor float. Participants also provided reasoning for 
their answers in written form to potentially provide insight into participants’ explicit 
thinking about each item.  
In addition, participants were asked to rate their agreement with 10 
statements related to sinking and floating objects on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
from “Agree” to “Disagree.” The statements were chosen to reflect intuitive beliefs 
about sinking and floating objects, for example, “Heavy objects always sink” and 
“Hollow objects always float” (see Appendix A for full list of statements).  
Finally, participants responded to the same open-ended prompt presented 
at the beginning of the session asking them to describe a rule or set of rules for 
determining sinking and floating. The conceptual knowledge assessment was 
administered on a computer using Qualtrics survey software. 
 
Procedure 
 All participants began the procedure with the prior knowledge assessment. 
This was followed by the Flanker task. This task served the additional role in 
providing a delay between assessment of prior knowledge and the training phase 
to decrease the likelihood of information about sinking/floating rules and/or 
associations for individual objects being recalled from working memory. 
Training phase. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions: explicit training, implicit training, incidental training, or no training. The 
sequence of objects used in the training phase was based on performance data 
from a previous study (Wang, Varma, & Varma, 2012). After 10 trials that conveyed 
the range of materials, shapes, and sizes to expect, each subsequent set of 10 
objects were designed to elicit and challenge intuitions about sinking and floating 
objects. For example, in a set that elicited the intuition “large objects sink,” several 
objects congruent with this intuition (i.e. large, sinking objects) were presented, 
  
65 
followed by objects incongruent with this intuition (i.e. large, floating objects). The 
order of congruent (C) and incongruent (I) objects in relation to each intuition 
followed the pattern: C, C, C, I, C, C, I, C, I, I. The other intuitive ideas activated 
were: “small objects float,” “objects with holes sink,” and “hollow objects float.” 
Participants assigned to the explicit training condition were instructed to 
“search for a rule or set of rules that could be used to make sinking and floating 
judgments.” In the implicit training condition, participants were instructed to “make 
judgments as quickly as possible without thinking too much. Just trust that your 
performance will improve over time” (directions adapted from Zimmerman & Pretz, 
2013).  
The incidental training condition tested whether mere exposure to sinking 
and floating object associations would improve performance. The training task in 
this condition consisted of the same 50 objects presented in the implicit and explicit 
training conditions. However, instead of making predictions, the participants’ task 
was to “remember as many objects as possible.” After a fixation period of 1500 
ms, each object was displayed with the word “SINK” or “FLOAT” below the object 
picture and object information table; each object was displayed for 4000 ms. While 
each object was displayed, the participant was required to press the ‘S’ key if the 
display contained the word “SINK”; no action was taken if the screen displayed 
“FLOAT.” The purpose of this task was to ensure that the participant paid attention 
to the sinking and floating information for each object throughout the sequence. 
Participants in the no training condition did not complete the training task, 
though they participated in cognitive assessment and intuitive and conceptual 
knowledge assessment tasks. The 4 conditions—explicit training, implicit training, 
incidental training, and no training—were treated as a between-subjects factor. 
After completing the specified training task (or lack thereof), the participants 
completed the Dimensional Change Card Sort task to increase the likelihood that 
knowledge gained from training would be recalled from long-term, rather than 
working memory. 
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Testing phase. In the testing phase, participants were given two 
assessments, the sinking and floating prediction task designed to capture intuitive 
knowledge, and the conceptual knowledge test. For each participant, the implicit 
knowledge assessments were presented first, followed by the explicit knowledge 
assessments. This was done to avoid possible testing effects related to explicit 
knowledge assessments. 
In this sinking and floating task, reaction time and prediction accuracy were 
recorded for each trial. In addition, objects were analyzed based on whether or not 
they violated intuitive rules about sinking and floating (i.e., ‘larger objects sink,’ 
‘smaller object float,’ ‘objects with holes sink,’ and ‘hollow objects float’). In order 
to analyze intuitive responses, objects that violated one or more intuitive rules were 
labeled “Incongruent”; objects that did not violate intuitive rules were labeled 
“Congruent.” Object congruence with intuitive rules was analyzed as a between-
subjects factor. 
Debriefing interview. Following all computer-based tasks, participants 
answered questions in an interview conducted by the researcher. Participants 
described the strategies they used to make sinking and floating predictions, 
including what information they focused on during the task. If a strategy wasn’t 
spontaneously described, participants were prompted to explain whether they 
used information on the left (object image) or right (object information table) of the 
screen when making their predictions. This information was used to determine if 
the participant employed the density rule (i.e. mass greater than volume = sink; 
mass less than volume = float). Participants were also asked if they felt that they 
learned something from the tasks, and if so, whether they could put what they 
learned into words. This information was used to determine whether they learned 
the density rule during the task or previously learned the strategy. 
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Results 
 
 Training task performance. Prior to analysis, accuracy and reaction time 
data was inspected to identify outliers. One participant in the incidental training 
condition reported not following directions correctly for part of the training task, 
which was confirmed by a low accuracy score (M accuracy = .52 vs. group M 
accuracy = .99). Data from this participant was removed from further analysis of 
training data. 
To confirm that training manipulations were effective, a 3 x 2 mixed 
ANCOVA was conducted on accuracy data, with a between-subjects factor of 
Training with 3 levels (explicit, implicit, and incidental training) and a within-
subjects factor of Congruence with two levels (congruent, incongruent), and 
inhibition ability score as a covariate to control for individual differences. This 
analysis revealed main effects of Training condition (F (2, 37) = 18.060, p < .001, 
2 = 0.348) and Congruence (F (1, 37) = 11.080, p = .002, 2 = 0.119). These main 
effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction between Training and 
Congruence (F (2, 37) = 3.253, p = .050, 2 = 0.074). Visual examination of plots 
showed that the effect of Congruence was larger in the implicit training condition 
(congruent M = .92 vs. incongruent M = .84) than in the explicit training condition 
(congruent M = .95 vs. incongruent M = .90). In the incidental training condition, 
accuracy across congruent and incongruent was equivalent (congruent M = .99 vs. 
incongruent M = .99). The accuracy data results are summarized in Figure 4.2 
(top). 
These results provide evidence of the effectiveness of the task 
manipulations. The implicit training condition was designed to engage participants’ 
intuitive knowledge. The increased effect of Congruence is evidence that 
participants in the implicit training condition were more likely than participants in 
the explicit condition to rely on prior intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating 
to make their predictions. The lack of effect of Congruence in the incidental training 
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condition was expected, as this condition did not require making predictions (all 
answers were given on the screen).  
Analysis of reaction time data provided further confirmation of training 
manipulations. Prior to analyzing reaction time data, RTs were trimmed and 
transformed following guidelines outlined by Whelan (2008). To minimize effects 
of outliers, large RTs were truncated to 8000 ms, approximately 3 standard 
deviations above the mean. This resulted in < 1% of observations being truncated. 
To maintain power, RTs were subjected to log transformation prior to analysis. 
Also, RT data analyzed for the incidental training condition were only from trials 
that required a response (no response trials did not register RTs). 
Training reaction time data was analyzed using a 3 x 2 mixed ANCOVA, 
with a between-subjects factor of Training condition with 3 levels (explicit, implicit, 
and incidental) and a within-subjects factor of Congruence with two levels 
(congruent, incongruent). Inhibition ability score was included as a covariate in the 
model to control for individual differences. This analysis showed main effects of 
Training (F (2, 37) = 5.317, p = .009, 2 = 0.212) and Congruence (F (1, 37) = 
10.892, p = .002, 2 = 0.018). The main effects were qualified by a significant two-
way interaction between Training and Congruence (F (2, 37) = 9.326, p < .001, 2 
= 0.030). Post-hoc analyses of comparisons with adjusted p-values showed that 
the effect of Congruence was greatest for the explicit training condition. In this 
condition, RTs on congruent trials were significantly longer than on incongruent 
trials (p < .001). Differences between congruent and incongruent trials in the 
implicit and incidental training conditions were not significant (ps > .075). 
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Figure 4.2. Training task performance for Experiment 1. Accuracy (top) 
and median RT (ms) (bottom) for each group, separated by congruence. 
 
 These results provide further evidence that manipulations to training task 
instructions were effective. Increasing the degree active production led to slower 
predictions in the in the explicit training condition compared to the more passive 
conditions. The effect of Congruence in the explicit training and implicit training 
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conditions showed that predictions were faster for incongruent trials, suggesting 
that participants relied on intuitive knowledge when making predictions in these 
conditions. Interestingly, the effect of Congruence was opposite for the incidental 
training condition: responses on incongruent trials were slower than congruent 
trials. This may have been due to participants being slowed down when making 
responses conflicting with their expectations based on intuitive knowledge. It is 
possible that participants in this condition, while not required to actively make 
predictions, did so anyways, providing evidence of implicit learning in this 
condition. 
 Sinking and floating prediction task performance. To examine the effect 
of training on intuitive knowledge (RQ 1-1), a 4 x 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted on sinking and floating prediction accuracy data, with a between-
subjects factor with 4 levels (Training: no training, explicit, implicit, and incidental), 
and 2 within-subjects factors with 2 levels each (Congruence: congruent or 
incongruent; Novelty: new or old). Inhibition ability score was included as a 
covariate to control for effects of individual differences. The results of this analysis 
showed significant main effects of Training (F(3,52) = 5.486, p < .001, 2 = 0. 169) 
and Congruence (F(1,52) = 72.160, p <.001, 2 = 0.223). These main effects were 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Congruence by Novelty (F(1, 52) = 
7.952, p = .007, 2 = 0.013).  
Post-hoc pairwise analysis, with Bonferroni adjustment of p-values, showed 
the main effect of Training on accuracy was driven by the no training condition (M 
= .64, SE = .02) being significantly less accurate than each of the other Training 
conditions (ps < .001). This result supports the hypothesis that training results in 
gains in implicit knowledge. Analysis of the Congruence by Novelty interaction 
showed that the effect of Congruence was greater within new trials than old trials. 
New, incongruent trials (M = .70, SE = .02) were less accurate than old, 
incongruent trials (M = .76, SE = .02) (p = .018). However, for congruent trials, 
there was no significant difference between old and new trials (p = .305). That is, 
participants in training conditions transferred implicit knowledge better on 
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congruent trials than on incongruent trials. This suggests that the implicit 
knowledge gained through instruction was more helpful on congruent than on 
incongruent trials. Accuracy data is summarized in Figure 4.3. 
Analysis of reaction time data provided further evidence for the effect of 
training on intuitive knowledge (RQ 1-1). Prior to conducting the analysis of 
reaction times, data was trimmed and transformed following guidelines outlined by 
Whelan (2008). To minimize effects of outliers, large RTs were truncated to 8000 
ms, approximately 3 standard deviations above the mean. This resulted in < 3% of 
observations being truncated. To maintain power and better meet assumptions of 
statistical models, RTs were subjected to log transformation prior to analysis. 
A 4 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANCOVA was conducted on the log-
transformed RTs, with Training condition (4 levels) as a between-subjects factor, 
Congruence (congruent/incongruent) and Novelty (old/new) as within-subjects 
factors, and inhibition ability score as a covariate. This analysis showed significant 
main effects of Training (F(3, 52) = 16.425, p < .001, 2 = 0.458), Congruence (F(1, 
52) = 23.122, p < .001, 2 = 0.016), and Novelty (F(1, 52) = 8.253, p = .006, 2 = 
0.006). These main effects were qualified by two significant two-way interactions: 
one for Training by Congruence (F(3, 52) = 7.144, p < .001, 2 = 0.014), and 
another for Congruence by Novelty (F(1, 52) = 10.523, p = .002, 2 = 0.006).  
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Figure 4.3. Accuracy on sinking and floating prediction task for     
Experiment 1.  
 
Pairwise comparisons, with Bonferroni adjustment to p-values, were 
analyzed for the main effects on RT. Analysis for the main effect of Training 
showed that trials in the no training condition were significantly longer than each 
of the other conditions (all ps < .001). The main effect of Congruence was due to 
congruent trials being significantly shorter than incongruent trials (p < .001). 
Together, these main effects support the hypothesis that training results in implicit 
learning related to sinking and floating by demonstrating a facilitative effect to 
processing. The main effect of Novelty showed that new trials were significantly 
slower than old trials (p < .001), suggesting that memory for objects presented in 
training (whether implicit or explicit) facilitated responses. 
The two-way interactions qualifying these main effects provide further 
support of hypotheses and details related to RQ 1-1. Pairwise analysis (with 
Bonferroni-adjusted p-values) for the 2-way interaction between Congruence and 
Novelty showed that new, incongruent trials were the slowest in comparison to the 
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other types of trials (ps < .05). Thus, knowledge gained from training does not 
transfer to new situations where intuitive and scientific rules are incongruent. The 
interaction between Congruence and Training showed that the effect of 
Congruence varied by Training. The effect of Congruence was strongest in the 
implicit training condition; within this condition, incongruent trials were significantly 
longer than congruent trials (p < .001). This difference can be interpreted as 
indication that participants in this condition gained implicit knowledge of the 
difference between trials where intuitive knowledge is helpful and when it is not. 
That is, participants in the implicit training condition learned to recognize and slow 
down (i.e. suppress) their intuitions that might lead to incorrect predictions. 
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Figure 4.4. Reaction times on sinking and floating prediction task for    
Experiment 1. Median RTs with standard error of medians for congruent 
and incongruent trials across training conditions.  
 
Conceptual test measure. The 12 selected response items were scored 0 
(incorrect) or 1 (correct). Responses to the written reasoning prompts on the 10 
conceptual knowledge items were rated on a scale of 0 to 2 points, according to a 
rubric measuring density reasoning (see Appendix B for rubric). Ratings were 
made by the researcher and an additional rater blind to experimental conditions. 
There was a satisfactory level of agreement between raters (Cohen’s kappa = 
.698, p < .001) and disagreements were resolved through discussion. The test of 
conceptual knowledge had high reliability (Cronbach’s  = .88). A total of 32 points 
were possible on the test, 12 points from selected answers, 20 points from written 
responses of reasoning. The mean score was 21.15, with a range of 4.75 to 32 
and a standard deviation of 7.13. A summary of the results of the conceptual 
assessment is provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1  
Summary of Conceptual Test Measures for Experiment 1
 
 
To determine the effect of training on explicit conceptual knowledge (RQ 1-
2), scores on the conceptual test measure were analyzed using two-way ANOVAs 
with Training as a between-subjects factor. Comparisons of scores across training 
conditions did not reveal a significant effect of Training on scores for selected 
response items, written reasoning prompts, or on total score (see Table 4.2 for 
statistical test results). This supports the hypothesis that the implicit training 
employed in Experiment 1 would not have a corresponding effect on conceptual 
knowledge. 
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Table 4.2  
Pre-Post Explicit Knowledge Assessment Results for Experiment 1 
 
 
Pre-post explicit knowledge assessment. Responses to the free 
response prior knowledge prompt were rated according to a rubric ranging from 0 
to 5 points, reflecting knowledge of the density rule (0 = no knowledge, 5 = mature 
scientific knowledge of density, see Appendix C for rubric and examples). A rating 
of 2 or higher indicated that the participant mentioned “density” in their response; 
a rating of 4 or higher indicated an accurate description of the definition of density 
(ratio of mass to volume). Responses were coded by the researcher and a rater 
blind to experimental manipulations. There was a satisfactory level of agreement 
between raters (Cohen’s kappa = .701, p < .001 across all ratings) and 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. Across groups, the mean prior 
knowledge rating was 2.09 (SE = 0.2). A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test indicated 
that pre-post changes across all participants were greater than 0, Z = 322.5, p < 
.001. The data from the pre-post assessment are summarized in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3  
Agreement Ratings with Intuitive Statements for Experiment 1 
 
Ratings are coded with ‘1’ as ‘agree’ and ‘5’ as ‘disagree.’ Non-parametric statistical tests 
(Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon tests) were used to analyze differences across conditions. 
Statistically significant differences are noted with a * p < .05.  
 
To address whether training had an effect on explicit knowledge about 
sinking and floating (RQ 1-2), pre, post, and change scores were compared across 
Training conditions. Based on a non-parametric analysis of variance (Kruskal-
Wallis test), there were no significant differences across groups (see Table 4.2 for 
statistics). This suggests that training did not affect explicit knowledge about 
sinking and floating. However, power analysis showed that this measure may have 
been underpowered, so this interpretation should be accepted with caution.  
Non-parametric ANOVAs (Kruskal-Wallis tests) were conducted for 
responses to each statement, as examination of the distribution of ratings showed 
that they were skewed. These analyses revealed significant differences in 
agreement ratings across Training conditions found for three intuitive statements. 
Participants in the explicit condition were more likely than those in the no training 
condition to disagree with the statement “Objects with holes always sink” (H (3) = 
11.57, p = .01; U = 106.5, p = .005). Participants in the implicit training condition 
showed more agreement than those in the no training condition to the statement 
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“Objects made of wood always float” (H(3) = 7.880, p = .05; U = 27.5, p = .008). 
Finally, for the intuitive statement “Objects made of wax always float,” participants 
in the no training condition had significantly higher disagreement ratings than for 
all other conditions (ps < .05). In these latter two cases, a lower number (indicating 
greater agreement) with the intuitive rule was more accurate. 
Relationship between performance on prediction task and conceptual 
assessment. To examine the effect of training on the relationship between 
different types of knowledge (RQ 1-3), the correlations between prediction 
accuracy and conceptual test scores were calculated for each group. Rank-
ordered correlations were calculated (Kendall’s ) to avoid violating assumptions 
of normality. The correlations between performance on sinking and floating 
predictions and the conceptual test for the no training and explicit training 
conditions were strong, positive, and significant (ps < .01). The correlations for the 
implicit training and incidental training conditions were not significant. The 
correlation and significance statistics are presented in Table 4.4; the data is 
summarized graphically in Figure 4.5.  
These results suggest that training tasks that improve performance in an 
implicit or incidental manner do so based on intuitive knowledge gains and not 
conceptual knowledge. The strong correlation between scores in the explicit 
training condition suggest that improvements in the sinking and floating prediction 
task were based on increased explicit knowledge of rules governing sinking and 
floating.  
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Table 4.4.  
Kendall’s Rank Correlations between Conceptual Test Scores and Sinking 
and Floating Prediction Task Accuracy for Experiment 1 
 
Condition 
 
 
 
p 
No Training .54 .006* 
Explicit Training .65 .002* 
Implicit Training .35 .09 
Incidental Training .16 .45 
* p < .05 
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Figure 4.5. Relationship between conceptual test score and sinking and 
floating prediction task accuracy by Training condition for Experiment 1.  
 
  
  
81 
Discussion 
 
 The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence that learning related to 
scientific phenomena occurs in tasks designed to engage implicit learning 
processes. Following training, participants in the explicit, implicit, and incidental 
training conditions showed improved performance in predicting whether objects 
sink or float in water—their predictions were more accurate and faster.  
Further evidence of learning comes from performance on trials where new 
objects (i.e. not present during training) were presented; participants in the 3 
training conditions made more accurate predictions about novel objects than 
participants in the no training. Thus, participants were able to extract and transfer 
information about objects that was used to make more accurate predictions about 
new objects. If participants had simply memorized correct answers from training 
trials, we would expect to see (a) similar performance on new items by participants 
in the 3 training conditions as those in the no training condition, and (b) similar 
performance across congruent and incongruent old items. Further, improved 
performance on new, incongruent items suggests that these participants learned 
something about objects that violate intuitive rules. That is, improvement across 
both congruent and incongruent new trials (approximately 10% and 20% 
respectively) suggests that participants in training conditions did not simply 
reinforce and apply intuitive rules.  
 Although participants in the incidental training condition were required to 
respond with a button press (or no button press), this task did not require the 
generation of predictions prior to receiving correct information about sinking and 
floating object. Their performance provides evidence that learning can occur in a 
relatively passive manner. This is supported by the faster RTs for training trials in 
the incidental training condition as compared to training trials in the explicit and 
implicit training conditions. If participants in this condition generated predictions 
prior to responding, we would predict longer RTs compared to those in implicit 
training on incongruent trials during training. 
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More generally, the approximately equivalent performance, in terms of 
prediction accuracy, across explicit, implicit, and incidental training groups 
suggests the learning that occurs during these tasks is roughly equivalent. Thus, 
the improved performance across each of these groups is not influenced by the 
two key manipulations to the training task: whether participants are told to explicitly 
search for a rule governing sinking and floating object or not, and whether a 
prediction was generated or not. Although the most parsimonious explanation for 
the roughly equivalent accuracy gains is that these manipulations do not 
differentially affect learning, there was evidence for subtle, yet important, 
differences in the learning that results from each of the training conditions.  
First, in the intuitive rules task, participants in the explicit training condition 
were more likely to reject the intuitive rule “Objects with holes always sink” 
compared to no training controls. A hypothesis-testing strategy might account for 
this result; attending to data that contradicts a rule leads to rejection of that rule. 
On the other hand, participants in the implicit training condition were more likely to 
agree with the intuitive rule “Objects made of wood float.” While intuitive, this 
statement is also scientifically accurate (not taking into account wood type and 
water absorption). This supports the argument that those in the implicit training 
condition were more likely to learn an intuitive rule. 
 The other notable result from the sinking and floating prediction task results 
was that for the implicit training condition, incongruent trials were slower than 
congruent trials. To put this in context, consider a participant in the implicit training 
encountering a hollow object that sinks (i.e., incongruent with the intuitive rule 
“hollow objects float”). Before training, they responded to these types of trials faster 
than compared to those that were congruent with intuitive rules. However, after 
training, they took more time to make these predictions. There are at least two 
possible explanations for the observed difference in RTs between congruent and 
incongruent trials for participants in the implicit learning condition.  
One interpretation is that participants in the implicit learning condition may 
have learned how to better apply intuitive rules to congruent trials. Thus, congruent 
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trials were faster than incongruent trials because using these rules requires less 
cognitive processing. For example, if people use the intuitive rule “hollow objects 
float,” then we would expect people to respond faster to items that are hollow. 
Analysis of RTs in the no training condition showed similar median RTs for hollow 
and non-hollow object.  
A second interpretation is that slower RTs during incongruent trials are the 
result of a cognitive “pause” during trials that violate intuitive sinking and floating 
rules. That is, through training participant learn to recognize trials that do not follow 
intuitive rules. Put another way, participants in the implicit training condition not 
only learned how to associate characteristics that reliably predict sinking and 
floating objects, they also learned which intuitive association were unreliable. This 
interpretation is in line with research demonstrating that developing science 
understanding involves the suppression of intuitive ideas (Shtulman & Varcarcel, 
2012; Masson, Potvin, Riopel, Foisy, 2014). 
 Results from this experiment also show that while there is a positive 
correlation between intuitive and conceptual knowledge without training, this 
relationship does not hold when training occurs. That is, participants gained 
knowledge to better predict whether objects sink or float in water, however, they 
did not make similar gains in their explicit conceptual knowledge.  
 Although the implicit learning task did not result directly in conceptual 
learning, it is possible that improved intuitive knowledge, indicated by both the 
activation of accurate intuitions and suppression of inaccurate intuitions, may 
enhance opportunities to gain conceptual knowledge (Bransford & Schwartz, 
1999; Schwartz & Bransford, 1998; Schwartz & Martin, 2004; Schwartz & Martin, 
2010). The relationship between intuitive and conceptual knowledge is further 
explored in Experiment 2 by examining how directly presenting conceptual 
knowledge to participants influences both their intuitive and conceptual knowledge.  
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2 
 
Building on Experiment 1, Experiment 2 explores the general hypothesis 
that the implicit knowledge gained through implicit training activities can promote 
explicit knowledge when combined with direct instruction. In typical science 
classroom instruction, students gain explicit knowledge of concepts through direct 
instruction. Direct instruction involves presenting overt descriptions and 
explanations of concepts, relationships, and rules underlying observable scientific 
phenomena or examples (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr & Nigam, 2004; 
Schwartz & Martin, 2004). Experiment 2 employs a video representation of typical 
direct instruction related to sinking and floating. This video was presented to 
participants in combination with the implicit training task from Experiment 1 to test 
the hypothesis that refining implicit knowledge can improve explicit knowledge 
gained from direct instruction. 
Another important consideration for learning is the sequencing of 
instructional activities designed to promote implicit and explicit knowledge. There 
may be an advantage to developing implicit knowledge before gaining explicit 
knowledge through direct instruction; conversely, having explicit knowledge before 
implicit training learning activities may be more effective. There is empirical and 
theoretical support for both possible sequences. For example, Mathews and 
colleagues (1980, Experiment 4) found that optimal learning of a simplified 
(biconditional) artificial grammar occurred when an implicit knowledge base was 
developed before generating explicit knowledge. Sequencing implicit learning 
before explicit learning is supported by theories that suggest that explicit 
knowledge develops from implicit knowledge (e.g., Dienes & Perner, 1999; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1986; Rünger & Frensch, 2008). On the other hand, Reber and 
colleagues (1980, Experiment 2) found that providing explicit information about 
underlying rules of an artificial grammar prior to an implicit learning task improved 
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subsequent ability to discriminate between grammatical and non-grammatical 
strings.  
Theory and evidence from science education research is also informative 
on the matter of sequencing. There are at least three reasons why sequences 
might be more or less effective for learning. First, theories of conceptual change 
have long emphasized that an important first step in learning is generating conflict 
with current conceptions (Limón, 2001; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). 
This cognitive conflict approach is based on the theory that learners must first 
become dissatisfied with their previous conceptions when learning a new concept. 
Accordingly, this suggests the conflict produced in the implicit training condition in 
Experiment 1 should occur before direct instruction. While the evidence that 
inducing conflict prior to instruction on science concepts is mixed (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993; Lee & Byun, 2012), this is a common pedagogical technique in science 
education. As such, there are valid instructional reasons to examine if the 
sequence consistent with the cognitive conflict strategy improves learning. 
Second, sequencing implicit training tasks before direct instruction may 
enhance explicit conceptual learning by providing “a time for telling” (Schwartz & 
Bransford, 1998). Opportunities to analyze a range of examples related to a 
concept can help people become sensitive to information in learning materials that 
they might otherwise overlook. Encountering examples of sinking and floating 
objects that are incongruent with intuitive rules might prepare participants 
understand an explanation from direct instruction materials. The prediction, then, 
is that when implicit learning is engaged before direct instruction about a scientific 
concept, people are more likely to later recall and apply this information. 
 Third, recent developments in conceptual change research suggest that 
cognitive conflict is more effective when sequenced after direct instruction on 
science concepts (Potvin, Sauriol, & Riopel, 2015). According to the prevalence 
model (Potvin, 2013), conceptual change occurs in three stages: (1) making 
scientific concepts available; (2) installing inhibitive “stop signs” for intuitive ideas 
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(i.e., cognitive conflict); and (3), increasing the automaticity of the application 
scientific concepts to various examples. The first stage of this model relies on 
gaining explicit knowledge of science concepts. As shown in Experiment 1, 
scientific concepts are not likely to be discovered through implicit training, so direct 
instruction is likely to be more effective for this stage. The implicit training task from 
Experiment 1 may be helpful for addressing the latter two stages in the prevalence 
model. Inhibitive “stop signs” can be installed by making predictions and getting 
feedback about sinking and floating objects that are incongruent with intuitions. 
The implicit training task also provides opportunities to develop fluency in applying 
scientific concepts across multiple situations, addressing the third stage of the 
prevalence model. 
 To test the effects of combining instructional tasks in different sequences, 
participants in Experiment 2 engaged the implicit training task from Experiment 1 
either before or after watching a direct instruction video on concepts relevant to 
sinking and floating. In addition to the direct + implicit and implicit + direct 
conditions, a direct instruction only condition was tested for comparison. The effect 
of these instructional tasks was measured in terms of both the implicit, intuitive 
knowledge and explicit conceptual knowledge gained during the tasks. The 
instruments used were the same as those in Experiment 1. Namely, implicit 
intuitive knowledge was measured by performance on sinking and floating 
predictions (accuracy and reaction time), and explicit conceptual knowledge was 
measured by answers to selected-response items and reasoning prompts.  
 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Experiment 2 addresses two research questions:  
RQ 2-1. Does the combination of implicit and direct instruction tasks have 
an increased effect on learning?  
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We hypothesize that combining implicit training with direct instruction will 
result in increases in both intuitive and conceptual knowledge. Research on implicit 
learning suggests that although implicit and explicit knowledge are distinct 
(Batterink, Reber, Neville, & Paller, 2015; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Green & 
Flowers, 2003), they can influence one another when learning tasks combine these 
forms of knowledge (e.g., Mathews, et al. 1989; Reber, et al., 1980; Rünger & 
Frensch, 2008; Sun, Mathews, & Lane, 2007). We predict that participants in 
conditions that combine implicit and direct instructional tasks will gain more implicit 
and explicit knowledge of sinking and floating objects than these types of training 
presented alone. Alternatively, if these types of training tasks do not help facilitate 
learning from one another, the learning effects will be similar across all conditions. 
RQ 2-2. How does the sequencing of implicit training and direct instruction 
influence the knowledge gained from these tasks? 
Two competing hypotheses suggest different learning outcomes with regard 
to sequencing. According to the conceptual conflict model (Limón, 2001; Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) participants in the implicit + direct condition are 
predicted to have a learning advantage because cognitive conflict provides 
motivation for subsequent learning. That is, the conflict that arises from the implicit 
training increases the likelihood that they will learn from the direct instructional 
materials. On the other hand, the prevalence model (Potvin, 2013) predicts that 
participants in the direct + implicit training condition will demonstrate superior 
learning because the science concepts are made available through direct 
instruction prior to application to examples in the implicit learning task. This affords 
learners the opportunity to develop fluency with concepts, making it more likely 
that they can express these ideas later.  
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Methods 
 
Design 
This study employed a between-subjects design in which the main factor 
was training condition with 3 levels –direct instruction, implicit + direct, and direct 
+ implicit. The response variables were accuracy and reaction time performance 
on the sinking and floating prediction task, which had two within-subjects factors 
with two levels (congruent/incongruent and new/old) and conceptual knowledge 
assessments. Individual differences were assessed using two well-established EF 
measures (DCCS and Flanker tasks).  
 
Participants 
 Based on the sample size analysis and results of Experiment 1, thirty-nine 
participants were recruited from the University of Minnesota via class 
announcements and recruitment postings. Participants ranged in age from 18-34 
(M = 20.8, SD = 3.47) years old and 29 were female. Participants were tested 
individually in a lab room during sessions that lasted approximately 55 minutes and 
were compensated with course credit or a $10 gift card. 
 
Materials 
 The materials for Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 
1, with the addition of a direct instruction training module. This consisted of a 5.5-
minute long video designed to provide teachers with background knowledge 
related to a middle school science unit on density. This video was adapted from 
content on the American Chemical Society’s “Middle School Science” website 
(www.middleschoolscience.com) and covered topics such as the calculation of 
density, the density of water, the molecular structure of wax and clay, and how 
density relates to sinking and floating objects (the full content of the video is 
described in Appendix D). Participants were given a brief introduction to the video 
  
89 
and told to pay close attention throughout the video, with the goal of trying to learn 
as much as possible. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 conditions: direct, implicit + 
direct, and direct + implicit. Each session began with a free response prompt (the 
same used in Experiment 1) asking participants to describe their knowledge of 
rules governing sinking and floating objects. This was followed by the DCCS task 
in all conditions to provide a measure of inhibition ability. In the direct instruction 
condition, participants watched the video only. In the implicit + direct condition, 
participants were first given the implicit training task described in Experiment 1, 
followed by the video from the direct instruction condition. In the direct + implicit 
condition, the video followed the implicit training task.  
After the training phase, all participants completed the Flanker task as a 
second measure inhibition ability. This was followed by the sinking and floating 
prediction task to measure intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating. Finally, 
each participant completed the same conceptual knowledge measures—the 
conceptual test, agreement with intuitive rules, and free response prompt (identical 
to pre-training task)—as participants in Experiment 1.  
 
 
Results 
 
 Training task performance. In two of the three conditions, participants 
engaged in an implicit training task. Training task accuracy and reaction time 
performance was analyzed to determine if sequencing the task before or after 
direct instruction had an effect on performance during training.  
Training accuracy on the implicit training tasks was analyzed using a 2 x 2 
mixed model ANCOVA, with Training condition (implicit + direct and direct + 
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implicit) as a between-subjects factor with two levels and trial Congruence 
(congruent / incongruent) as a within-subjects. Inhibition ability was included as a 
covariate in the model to control for individual differences. Analysis revealed a 
main effect of Congruence (F (1, 24) = 28.596, p < .001, 2 = 0.267), with accuracy 
on congruent trials (M = .95, SE = .01) significantly higher than on incongruent 
trials (M = .85, SE = .01). The accuracy results for the implicit training task across 
the two conditions are shown in Figure 5.1 (top).  
This result provides evidence that participants employed prior intuitive 
knowledge when making predictions during the training task. Participants relied on 
prior intuitive knowledge, regardless of whether the implicit learning task occurred 
before or after direct instruction.  
To further determine whether there were differences in training performance 
in different sequences, reaction time data was compared. Prior to analyzing 
reaction time data, RTs were trimmed and transformed following guidelines 
outlined by Whelan (2008). To minimize effects of outliers, large RTs were 
truncated to 8000 ms, approximately 3 standard deviations above the mean. This 
resulted in 1.5% of observations being truncated. To maintain power, RTs were 
subjected to log transformation prior to analysis.  
A 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA (Condition by Congruence) was performed on the 
truncated and log-transformed data, with inhibition ability score as a covariate. This 
analysis showed a main effect of Congruence (F (1, 24) = 31.655, p < .001, 2 = 
0.088). Across direct + implicit and implicit + direct conditions, participants were 
slower to respond on congruent trials (Median RT = 1376.5 ms, SE median = 120 
ms) than incongruent trials (Median RT = 1106.5 ms, SE median = 67 ms). 
Reaction time data is summarized in Figure 5.1 (bottom). 
The results of the analysis of reaction time data further support the claim 
that participants use prior intuitive knowledge to make sinking and floating 
predictions during training. Faster responses on incongruent trials indicate that 
participants relied on intuitive rules to make their predictions. 
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Figure 5.1. Training task performance for Experiment 2. Accuracy (top) and 
median RT (ms) (bottom) for each group and each level of congruence. 
 
Sinking and floating prediction task performance. To examine the effect 
of combining implicit training tasks with direct instruction on intuitive knowledge, 
sinking and floating prediction accuracy data was analyzed using a 3 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA, with a between-subjects factor with 3 levels (Training: direct, implicit + 
direct, and direct + implicit) and 2 within-subjects factors with 2 levels each 
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(Congruence: congruent and incongruent; Novelty: old and new). Inhibition ability 
scores were included as a covariate in the model to control for individual 
differences. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Congruence, F(1, 
36) = 20.411, p < .001, 2 = 0.124 where congruent trials (M = .93, SE = .01) were 
significantly more accurate than incongruent trials (M =.83 SE = .01) (p < .001). 
The results displayed in Figure 5.2 show that the effect of Congruence was smaller 
in the direct + implicit condition compared to other conditions. This pattern was 
more pronounced in new trials. However, this interaction effect failed to reach 
significance (F(2, 36) = 3.244, p = .0506, 2 = 0.012). The effect of Congruence 
suggests that participants across all groups were more likely to make accurate 
predictions when objects had features that were congruent with intuitive rules 
about sinking and floating. 
Prior to analyzing reaction time data, RTs were trimmed and transformed 
following guidelines outlined by Whelan (2008). To minimize effects of outliers, 
large RTs were truncated to 8000 ms, approximately 3 standard deviations above 
the mean. This resulted in 1.1% of observations being truncated. To maintain 
power and better meet the normality assumptions of the statistical model 
employed, RTs were subjected to log transformation prior to analysis.  
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Figure 5.2. Accuracy on sinking and floating prediction task in Experiment 2.  
 
Sinking and floating prediction RT data were analyzed using a 3 x 2 x 2 
mixed ANCOVA, with a between-subjects factor with three levels (Training: direct, 
implicit + direct, and direct + implicit), two within-subjects factors with two levels 
each (Congruence: congruent and incongruent; Novelty: old and new), and 
inhibition ability score as a covariate. This analysis revealed main effects of 
Training (F(2, 36) = 6.147, p =.005, 2 = 0.233) and Novelty (F(1, 36) = 12.251, p 
=.001, 2 = 0.011). These main effects were qualified by a significant two-way 
interaction of Training by Congruence (F(2, 36) = 3.496, p =.027, 2 = 0.013). 
Further examination of this interaction showed that the pattern of the effect of 
Training on RT was different for congruent trials and incongruent trials. For 
congruent trials, RTs showed the following pattern: direct > implicit + direct > direct 
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+ implicit (ps < .035). For incongruent trials, the following pattern was observed: 
direct = implicit + direct > direct + implicit (see in Figure 5.3). RTs for incongruent 
trials in the direct and implicit + direct were not significantly different (p = .450), but 
both were significantly longer than incongruent trials in the direct + implicit 
condition (ps < .001). The effect of combining implicit training with direct instruction 
was that it resulted in faster responses, but only on trials that were congruent with 
intuitive rules. For incongruent trials, faster responses only occurred when direct 
instruction came before the implicit training tasks. This supports the prediction 
made by the prevalence model that the providing scientific concepts before 
application to examples is more effective in developing scientific understanding.  
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Figure 5.3. Reaction times on sinking and floating prediction task for 
Experiment 2. 
 
Conceptual test measure. The effect of combinations of implicit learning 
tasks and direct instruction on conceptual knowledge was measured using a test 
of conceptual knowledge following training. Written responses were rated 
according to a rubric (see Appendix B) by the researcher and an additional rater 
blind to experimental conditions. Ratings were made by the researcher and an 
additional rater blind to experimental conditions. There was an acceptable level of 
agreement between raters (Cohen’s kappa = .698 across all items) and 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. The test of conceptual 
knowledge had high reliability (Cronbach’s  = .88). The mean total score was 
21.90 out of a maximum of 32, with a range of 5.5 to 32, and SD = 7.75.  Selected 
and written reasoning responses for each condition, as well as the total summed 
score, showed no significant differences among groups based on analysis 
employing two-way ANCOVAs, with Training as a between-subjects variable and 
inhibition ability score as a covariate (ps > .74).  
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Table 5.1.  
Summary of Conceptual Test Measures for Experiment 1
 
 
A summary of the results of the conceptual knowledge test for each training 
condition is given in Table 5.1. These results suggest that combining implicit 
training tasks with direction instruction did not provide a significant advantage in 
terms of explicit knowledge related to sinking and floating. However, this claim 
should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size in this experiment. 
Pre-post density knowledge assessment. Responses to the pre-post 
free-response knowledge prompt (same from Experiment 1) were coded from 0 to 
5 points by the researcher and an additional rater blind to experimental conditions. 
There was a satisfactory level of agreement between raters (Cohen’s kappa = 
.701, p < .001 across all ratings) and disagreements were resolved through 
discussion. Based on a non-parametric analysis of variance (Kruskal-Wallis test), 
pre-training response scores were statistically equal across Training conditions 
(H(2) = 0.175, p = .916). A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test indicated that post-training 
scores were significantly higher than pre-training scores, Z = 322.5, p < .001. Non-
parametric analysis of variance (Kruskall-Wallis test) showed that there was no 
significant effect of Training condition on gain scores (H(2) = 0.079, p = .962). 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the pre-post density knowledge results. These 
results provide further evidence that combining implicit training tasks with direction 
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instruction did not provide a significant advantage in terms of explicit knowledge 
related to sinking and floating. This may have been due to the fact that the direct 
instruction improved explicit knowledge and reasoning equally across all 
conditions. 
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Table 5.2.  
Pre-Post Explicit Knowledge Assessment Results for Experiment 2   
 
 
Agreement with intuitive rules. Participants’ agreement ratings for 
statements reflecting intuitive rules regarding sinking and floating objects is 
summarized in Table 5.5. There were no statistical differences in agreement 
ratings among Training conditions for all but one of the intuitive statements. 
Participants in the Direct condition had ratings indicating stronger agreement with 
the intuitive statement “Objects made of wood always float,” than participants in 
the Implicit + Direct condition (Z = 21, p = .013). This result shows that combining 
implicit and direct training may have a negative effect on explicit knowledge about 
accurate intuitive rules. In this case, participants in the direct condition were more 
likely to agree with an accurate intuitive rule. This result appears to be 
contradictory with implicit knowledge demonstrated by these groups, as 
participants in each of these groups demonstrated similar performance on 
congruent trials during the sinking and floating prediction task. 
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Table 5.3.  
Mean Agreement Ratings with Intuitive Rules for Experiment 2 
 
Ratings are coded with ‘1’ as ‘agree’ and ‘5’ as ‘disagree.’ Non-parametric statistical tests 
(Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon) were used to analyze differences across conditions. 
Statistically significant differences are noted with a * p < .05).  
 
Relationship between performance on prediction task and conceptual 
assessment. To examine the relationship between different types of knowledge, 
the correlations between prediction accuracy and conceptual test scores were 
calculated for each Training condition. For this analysis, data from all participants 
were included. Rank-ordered correlations were calculated (Kendall’s ) to avoid 
violating assumptions of normality. The correlations between performance on 
sinking and floating predictions and the conceptual test for the direct and implicit + 
direct Training conditions were strong, positive, and significant (ps < .04). For 
participants in these conditions, higher prediction accuracy on the sinking and 
floating prediction task was associated with higher scores on the conceptual 
knowledge assessment. The correlation for the direct + implicit condition was not 
significant (p = .312). That is, there was no association between the two types of 
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scores in the direct + training condition. The correlation and significance statistics 
are presented in Table 5.4 and the data is summarized graphically in Figure 5.4. 
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Table 5.4.  
Kendall’s Rank Correlations between Conceptual Test Scores and Sinking 
and Floating Prediction Task Accuracy for Experiment 2 
 
Training Condition 
 
 
 
p 
Direct  .54 .013* 
Implicit + Direct .46 .031* 
Direct + Implicit .22 .312 
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Figure 5.4. Relationship between conceptual test score and sinking and 
floating prediction task accuracy by Training condition for Experiment 2.   
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Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2 confirm and extend the findings from 
Experiment 1. The main finding from Experiment 1 was that tasks designed to 
engage implicit learning improves performance for predicting sinking and floating 
objects by reinforcing accurate intuitions and increasing sensitivity to whether or 
not objects are congruent with prior intuitions. That is, implicit learning tasks can 
influence intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating. However, Experiment 1 
also showed that implicit learning tasks alone are likely not sufficient for developing 
explicit conceptual knowledge. To encourage development of explicit conceptual 
knowledge, participants in Experiment 2 were presented with direct instruction on 
concepts relevant to sinking and floating objects. Experiment 2 explored two 
research questions: (1) Does combining implicit learning and direct instruction 
tasks have an effect on the knowledge gained from each? And, (2) does the 
sequencing of different instructional tasks influence their impact on learning? 
Below, research questions are considered in terms of implicit intuitive knowledge 
and explicit conceptual knowledge as measured in the experiment. 
Effect of sequences combining implicit learning and direct instruction 
tasks on implicit intuitive knowledge. The results of Experiment 2 showed that 
combining implicit learning and direct instruction tasks led to changes in implicit 
intuitive knowledge, confirming and extending the results of Experiment 1. 
Performance on the sinking and floating prediction task showed that in general 
participants in the two conditions that combined training tasks made more accurate 
and faster responses compared to those that received direction instruction alone. 
This improvement suggests that combining implicit and explicit learning tasks 
improves implicit intuitive knowledge. 
Gains in accuracy were qualified by a significant three-way interaction of 
Training by Congruence by Novelty. Analysis of this interaction showed that 
participants in the implicit + direct training condition made accuracy gains on new, 
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congruent trials in comparison to the direct training condition (see right side of 
Figure 5.2). This result for the implicit + direct training condition is consistent with 
findings from Experiment 1, which showed that implicit training improved accuracy 
on congruent trials. This improvement was interpreted as resulting from the 
reinforcement of correct intuitive rules. This interpretation is further supported by 
RT data, which showed that these same predictions were faster in the implicit + 
direct training condition than in the direct condition. Taken together, this provides 
further evidence that engaging in implicit learning tasks prior to direct instruction 
provides opportunities to reinforce and consolidate accurate intuitive knowledge. 
Accuracy and RTs on new, incongruent trials were not significantly different 
between these conditions. Given the significant two-way interaction of Training by 
Congruence on RTs, the observed pattern suggests that participants in the implicit 
+ direct condition were slower than would have been expected by an effect of 
Training alone. Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, we interpret this as 
evidence of cognitive conflict in the implicit + direct condition. Thus, the overall 
effect of the sequence combining implicit task training before direct instruction is 
similar to implicit training alone in terms of how it improves implicit intuitive 
knowledge—it reinforces correct intuitive rules and slows down incorrect intuitive 
rules.  
Participants in the other combined sequence, the direct + implicit training 
condition, made more accurate predictions on new, incongruent trials in 
comparison to the direct condition. Further, the pattern of the RTs for the two-way 
interaction of Training by Congruence showed that these responses were 
significantly faster for this condition in comparison to the other conditions. The 
accuracy and RT for congruent and incongruent trials in the direct + implicit training 
condition were similar to one another, suggesting that a similar strategy was 
applied across these trials. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 8 out of 
the 11 participants in this condition reported applying the density rule strategy 
during post-interview. Together, this evidence supports the claim that participants 
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in the direct + implicit training sequence were more likely to successfully develop 
and apply a new intuitive rule (i.e. the density rule) when making their sinking and 
floating predictions.  
While both conditions that combined tasks increased explicit knowledge, 
there is also evidence that direct instruction alone also had significant, yet smaller 
effects on performance on the sinking and floating prediction task. When compared 
to no training controls from Experiment 1, participants in the direct training 
condition demonstrated faster and more accurate intuitive predictions. These 
improvements were likely due to conceptual knowledge gains, as 7 of the 13 
participants in this condition reported using the density rule strategy at post-
interview. This claim is further supported by the lack of evidence of cognitive 
conflict related to inaccurate intuitive rules (i.e., similar RTs across congruent and 
incongruent trials).  
Effect of sequences combining implicit learning and direct instruction 
tasks on explicit conceptual knowledge. Analysis of conceptual knowledge 
measures indicated that the implicit learning task employed in these experiments 
did not enhance learning from direct instruction. In Experiment 2, no significant 
effects of training condition were found for the conceptual test scores (including 
selected-response and reasoning sub-scores), pre-post density knowledge 
assessment, or for agreement ratings with intuitive statements, with one exception. 
The only significant effect found in Experiment 2 conceptual knowledge 
measures was for agreement ratings for the statement “Objects made of wood 
always float” showed a significant effect of Training, with participants in the direct 
training condition agreeing more with this statement than participants in the implicit 
+ direct. This result is incongruent with performance on trials with objects made of 
wood; participants in the implicit + direct condition made predictions that were more 
accurate (M = .98) and faster (Median RT = 1053 ms) than those made by 
participants in the direct condition (M = .79, Median RT = 1588.5 ms). This 
suggests that performance on these trials was not informed by explicit knowledge 
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of a rule that “Objects made of wood always float.” One possible explanation for 
these observations is that the implicit knowledge leveraged for performance on 
sinking and floating predictions does not correspond with agreement ratings of 
explicit statements of intuitive rules. That is, explicit and implicit knowledge did not 
correspond. 
Although there was a lack of effect of condition within Experiment 2, 
comparisons across Experiment 1 and 2 training conditions (i.e., ignoring the no 
training condition) showed significant differences in two conceptual test measures 
across experiments. First, participants in Experiment 2 were more likely to report 
using the density rule strategy at post-interview (53%) vs. participants in 
Experiment 1 (19%) (t (58) = -3.01, p = .004). Second, Experiment 2 showed 
greater gains in pre-post density knowledge response ratings (Experiment 1 = 
0.306 vs. Experiment 2 = 0.937, t (62) = -2.63, p = .011). These differences provide 
evidence that direct instruction employed across Experiment 2 conditions 
improved explicit conceptual knowledge related to sinking and floating. 
There are theoretical reasons to support the finding that combining implicit 
training with direct instruction did not lead to improvements in explicit knowledge. 
First, gaining conceptual knowledge of sinking and floating involves 
representations of concepts independent from implicit knowledge. Thus, a lack of 
a “bridge” between implicit and explicit knowledge may account for the lack of a 
synergistic effect. It has been previously suggested that “analogical bridges” 
(Clement, 1993) or meta-representational processes (Karmiloff-Smith, 1986) may 
be important for making implicit knowledge accessible to conscious thought. 
Second, the information contained in implicit knowledge may not be sufficient to 
support scientific explanation. While people are able to implicitly learn to improve 
their performance in contexts governed by complex sequence and interactions, 
these improvements are based on covariation rather than causal relationships (e.g. 
Lewicki, 1986). Thus, implicit learning may be limited in its ability to support 
universal scientific principles. 
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Relationship between implicit intuitive knowledge and explicit 
conceptual knowledge. The findings from Experiment 2 build on the claim from 
Experiment 1 that intuitive knowledge and conceptual knowledge develop 
independently. Research on implicit learning shows that performance on implicit 
learning tasks can improve based on implicit knowledge that develops 
independently from explicit knowledge; this implicit knowledge is unconscious and 
unavailable for verbal report (Batterink, et al., 2015; Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 
1988; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, et al., 1980). Some researchers suggest 
that the independence of implicit and explicit knowledge may be due to separate 
memory systems for each type of learning process (e.g., Amsel, et al., 2008; Reber 
& Squire, 1994; Willingham, 1998); others argue that a single system is 
responsible for both types of knowledge (e.g. Shanks & St. John, 1994;  
Although these implicit and explicit learning processes may occur 
separately, researchers propose that implicit knowledge can become explicit under 
certain circumstances, such as unexpected events (Frensch, et al., 2003; Rünger 
& Frensch, 2008), re-representation in metamemory (Dienes & Perner, 1999; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1986), and sequencing of implicit and explicit learning tasks or 
hints (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Mathews, et al., 1989; Sun, Mathews, & Lane, 
2007). Common to these accounts is the view that knowledge develops from 
implicit to explicit. The results of the implicit + direct condition in Experiment 2 did 
not provide evidence for a synergistic effect of these types of learning in this 
direction. There are several reasons this might have occurred. One possibility is 
that the implicit learning task did not induce sufficient meaningful conflict (Chan, 
Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997; Limón, 2001) to engage hypothesis testing associated 
with explicit learning (Rünger & Frensch, 2008). For example, short stimulus 
presentation times can reduce explicit learning, even under intentional task 
instructions (Arciuli, Torkildsen, Stevens, & Simpson, 2014). Another possibility is 
that the conceptual knowledge required for success on the assessments used was 
not sufficiently addressed by the implicit learning task. That is, the knowledge 
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generated from the implicit learning task did not adequately match the material 
covered in the direct instruction to improve explicit conceptual knowledge. 
On the other hand, Experiment 2 provides evidence that explicit knowledge 
gained from the direct instruction could improve performance on the implicit 
knowledge assessment. The majority of participants in the direct and direct + 
implicit training conditions (6 of 10 and 8 of 11, respectively) reported using the 
density rule strategy to make sinking and floating predictions. Although these 
participants had explicit knowledge of the density rule, the application of the rule 
was not reliably translated to intuitive judgment performance (4 of these 14 
participants were accurate < 90% of the time). These findings suggest that 
combining direct instruction with implicit science tasks may improve learning, 
however, effective transfer may require more opportunities for making 
connections.  
Implications for conceptual change theory. Experiment 2 provides some 
evidence to support the prevalence model of conceptual change (Potvin, 2013). 
This model predicts that conceptual change occurs when opportunities for 
conceptual conflict occur after scientific concepts have been made available. The 
results of the direct + implicit training condition showed that learning the density 
strategy rule could improve performance on the sinking and floating prediction 
task. In particular, responses on new, incongruent trials were faster and more 
accurate in comparison to the other training conditions in Experiment 2. The 
pattern of responses for participants in this condition suggests that they made 
judgments based on the density rule. That is, they had the opportunity to develop 
fluency applying a new, scientifically accurate rule. 
A key component of the prevalence model, as well as other models of 
knowledge revision, is the idea of co-activation. Co-activation of prior inaccurate 
knowledge and newly-acquired accurate knowledge has been proposed as a key 
process in knowledge revision (Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014; Ohlsson, 2009) because 
it allows for competition between intuitive and conceptual knowledge. Response 
  
109 
competition has been theorized as an important process for resolving differences 
between prior and new conceptions (Ramsburg & Ohlsson, 2016). In the case of 
sinking and floating, introducing direct instruction prior to the implicit learning tasks 
could enhance learning for conceptual change by co-activating intuitive rules 
knowledge during implicit learning tasks. Unlike the direct and implicit + direct 
conditions, the implicit + direct training affords the opportunity to co-activate both 
incorrect scientific intuitions and correct scientific concepts during the implicit 
learning task. Thus, the implicit + direct training sequence may provide an 
important opportunity for revising intuitive knowledge about sinking and floating 
objects by putting inaccurate intuitive rules and the density rule in competition with 
one another. This condition did not produce appreciable gains in explicit 
conceptual knowledge over and above the gains provided by direct instruction, so 
further research is needed to determine if this sequence of learning can be 
leveraged to enhance conceptual knowledge gained through explicit learning. 
Previous studies have suggested that the superiority of prevalence model 
to the cognitive conflict model for conceptual change (Potvin, Sauriol, & Riopel, 
2015); however, the results of this study do not warrant such an interpretation. 
Participants in the implicit + direct gained fluency with accurate (albeit incomplete) 
intuitive rules about sinking and floating objects. For example, participants in this 
condition responded to trials involving objects made out of wood quickly (Median 
= 1053 ms) and at ceiling accuracy levels (98% correct). There was also evidence 
for cognitive conflict in the slowed responses to incongruent items. Further 
research is needed to determine how and if this subtle form of conflict can be 
utilized to build conceptual knowledge. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
This dissertation proposes that implicit learning is both a source of, and 
influence on, intuitive scientific knowledge important for conceptual change. The 
goal of the research presented is to advance this argument by (a) reviewing and 
connecting previous research on conceptual change and implicit learning, and (b) 
demonstrating the application of implicit learning task paradigms to a science 
concept where students demonstrate strong intuitive knowledge. In addition, the 
experiments in this dissertation were addressed the following research questions: 
(1) How do implicit science learning tasks influence scientific knowledge, and (2) 
How does sequencing combinations of implicit science learning tasks with direct 
instruction influence scientific knowledge? In answering these questions, I 
consider two different types of scientific knowledge: implicit intuitive knowledge 
and explicit conceptual knowledge involved in reasoning.  
The results of two experiments provide evidence that implicit learning tasks 
both activate and suppress intuitive scientific knowledge. Engaging implicit 
learning in science provides opportunities to activate and reinforce intuitions that 
provide reliably accurate predictions. Participants in the implicit and incidental 
training conditions in Experiment 1 and implicit + direct condition in Experiment 2 
showed increased accuracy and shorter reaction times on trials where intuitive 
rules and scientific concepts were congruent. Developing prior, intuitive knowledge 
can be a productive source for making accurate predictions, which is consistent 
with a key principle of constructivist theories of learning (Bransford, Brown, & 
Cocking, 2000; Cobb, 1994; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993).  
Implicit learning tasks can also suppress unproductive intuitions by 
providing opportunities to differentiate between productive and unproductive 
intuitive rules. This was evident in the “slow down” that occurred on trials where 
intuitive rules led to inaccurate predictions. Participants that engaged in implicit 
learning tasks (implicit and incidental conditions in Experiment 1; implicit + direct 
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condition in Experiment 2) demonstrated slower, less accurate predictions on 
incongruent trials. This observation is interpreted as a subtle, yet important, form 
of bottom-up cognitive conflict. Implicit learning tasks can disrupt inaccurate 
scientific intuitions by slowing down intuitive judgements, which could lead to 
conceptual change. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that further support is 
needed to capitalize on this change in intuitive knowledge to enhance conceptual 
learning.  
Implicit learning tasks in isolation are unlikely to lead to conceptual change. 
To develop understanding, a combination of implicit knowledge and direct 
presentation of scientific concepts may be optimal. Results from Experiment 2 
showed that direct instruction improves explicit knowledge and reasoning about a 
science concept. Combining implicit learning with direct instruction methods 
presents different potential advantages, depending on the order in which they are 
presented. On one hand, engaging implicit learning prior to instruction activates 
productive intuitions that can be coordinated with scientific concepts. It also 
induces the subtle form of cognitive conflict found in Experiment 1—responses to 
counterintuitive trials were more inaccurate and slower for participants in the 
implicit + direct condition. As suggested by the conceptual conflict model 
(Nussbaum & Novick, 1982; Posner, et al., 1982), this change in underlying 
intuitions may represent an important step in the progression toward scientific 
understanding. On the other hand, introducing direct instruction prior to implicit 
learning promotes competition between intuitions and science concepts. Results 
from Experiment 2 showed that participants in the direct + implicit condition were 
faster and more accurate predictions across on counterintuitive trials. Applying 
newly-acquired scientific concepts during an implicit learning task co-activates this 
knowledge with prior intuitive ideas. This allows science concepts and conflicting 
knowledge to compete, thus making it more likely for the science concept to be 
expressed when intuitions are activated. 
The studies described here provide evidence of the effects of implicit 
learning for scientific intuitions and conceptual knowledge related to sinking and 
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floating objects. However, it is not apparent whether or not these effects (a) can 
be readily applied to other scientific concepts, and (b) can support conceptual 
change. In the sections that follow, I review research that provides evidence that 
activating productive prior intuitions and suppressing unproductive prior intuitions 
through implicit learning tasks may represent a viable method for supporting and 
enhancing conceptual change in science and other content areas. 
 
Activating productive intuitions 
While the goal of science education is for students to develop accurate, 
explicit conceptual knowledge of scientific phenomena, it has also become clear 
that students’ prior, intuitive beliefs must also be addressed. Research from a wide 
range of disciplines, including cognitive science, developmental psychology, and 
science education, have proposed implicit cognitive elements that influence 
learning and reasoning about scientific phenomena and often result in 
misconceptions (Maeyer & Talanquer, 2013). Several of these implicit cognitive 
elements include: core knowledge (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), cognitive constraints 
(Gelman, 2004), fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), p-
prims (diSessa, 1993), ontological categories (Chi, 2008), implicit presuppositions 
(Vosniadou, 1994; Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2014), facets of understanding 
(Hammer & Elby, 2003; Minstrell, 1992, 2001), coordination classes (diSessa & 
Sherin, 1998), cognitive construals (Coley & Tanner, 2012), and conceptual 
resources (Redish, 2004; Taber, 2008). Although each of these intuitive elements 
is associated with different specific features, they each share two common 
features: (1) they are implicit or tacit forms of knowledge, in that they operate 
largely outside of conscious recall and control, and (2) they generate and guide 
productive thinking and reasoning about phenomena. 
Viewing students’ incomplete, naïve prior knowledge as a productive 
resource, rather than an obstacle or barrier to mature understanding, is consistent 
with constructivist views of how people learn (Hammer, 1996; Smith, diSessa, & 
Roschelle, 1993; Vygotsky, 1978). Constructivist theories assume that knowledge 
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is constructed from previous knowledge, regardless of the form of instruction 
(Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000; Cobb, 1994; Piaget, 1976; Vygotsky, 1978). 
Research shows that people use their intuitive knowledge in productive ways to 
construct explanations of scientific phenomena. For example, children combine 
their prior knowledge with school-learned knowledge to describe synthetic models 
of the Earth (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992); biology undergraduate majors use 
teleological assumptions when reasoning about evolutionary phenomena (Coley 
& Tanner, 2015); undergraduate chemistry students rely on “intuitive, spurious, 
and valid assumptions about the nature of chemical entities” when reasoning about 
structure-property relationships in the context of chemical reactions (Maeyer & 
Talanquer, 2013). While reasoning from intuitions can lead to scientifically 
inaccurate conclusions and expressions, shifting among these intermediate 
conceptions may represent an important progression in the development of 
scientific knowledge (Sadler, 1998). Further, these intuitions can provide valuable 
resources for instruction (e.g. Hammer 1996). 
Given that productive intuitions represent both knowledge-in-transition and 
resources for future learning, how can implicit science learning tasks help build 
and activate these intuitions? The experiments presented in this dissertation show 
that productive intuitions about sinking and floating can be reinforced through 
implicit learning tasks. Studies exploring implicit learning applied in two other 
domains, electricity and food nutrition, demonstrate the viability of these types of 
tasks across scientific concepts. 
Researchers have developed methods to study how people develop 
scientific intuitions about electricity concepts by employing learning tasks similar 
to implicit learning paradigms. A study by Chasseigne, Giraudeau, Lafon, & Mullet 
(2011) was designed to examine improvements in students’ ability to induce 
intuitions about electrical resistance in simple circuits. In each trial of the task, 
labeled diagrams of electrical circuits were presented to 7th grade, 9th grade, and 
college students, and their task was to mark an “X” on a scale to indicate the 
degree of electrical resistance. During learning sessions, participants were 
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presented with feedback on their judgments. The overall procedure involved 3 test 
sessions of 18 trials each and 2 learning sessions (35 trials, conducted in between 
first and second test sessions). The results showed that 25% of students were able 
to develop accurate intuitive knowledge of the inverse relationship between 
electrical current and voltage to make predictions about resistance. A larger 
proportion were able to accurately associate the relationship between one variable 
and the output. Most students were able to learn the direct relationship between 
electrical resistance and voltage (55%), and about one-third (32%) of students 
learned the inverse relationship between resistance and current. 
The results of this experiment further support the claim that implicit learning 
leads to the reinforcement of accurate scientific intuitions (i.e. positive relationship 
between voltage and resistance) in the absence of formal symbolic representations 
of this knowledge. Similar to the density concept involved in sinking and floating, 
the concept of electrical resistance involves a ratio between two quantities: voltage 
and current. Although more participants in this study were able to intuit the 
relationships involved in electrical resistance compared to what was found in the 
research presented in this dissertation (about 16% gained the density rule in 
Experiment 1), this can be explained by the fact that (a) there were more 
extraneous variables presented in each stimulus, and (b) the electrical concepts 
presented in this study do not have a high level of prior knowledge associated with 
them.  
Another example of implicit learning in a naturalistic setting is presented in 
a recent study that examined people’s perceptions of organic foods (Perkovic & 
Orquin, 2017). People have the general belief that organic foods are more 
nutritious than non-organic foods, despite a lack of conclusive science evidence to 
support this claim. In a series of studies, Perkovic and Orquin (2017) demonstrated 
that this belief is grounded in ecological rationality—foods that are organic are 
more likely to be foods that also happen to be healthy (i.e. you are more likely to 
find organic apples than organic potato chips). Therefore, people who purchase 
organic foods are more likely to be purchasing healthful foods. People are not only 
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sensitive to the statistical structure present in the naturalistic environment (Study 
1), but can also learn the statistical structure when the correlation of cues (organic 
and healthy food labels) are manipulated (Study 3). The results of an eye-tracking 
study showed that people were more likely to fixate on organic labels when they 
are positively correlated with health cues. This learning occurred despite the 
absence of explicit instruction about labels or how to use them. This study provides 
further evidence that people can learn to associate correlating cues that can lead 
to a productive, yet scientifically inaccurate, intuition (i.e. organic foods = healthful 
foods). Taken together with the results of the experiments presented here, these 
results provide evidence that people are able to implicitly learn associations 
relevant to scientific phenomena, and use these associations when making 
decisions in situations where conceptual knowledge is absent or has a reduced 
influence.  
 
Suppressing unproductive intuitions 
Although some intuitions can be helpful, others may represent spurious or 
mistaken associations. For example, while holes may cause some floating objects 
(such as boats) to sink, an object having holes is not a reliable cue for determining 
whether an object will sink or float. Thus, in some cases, it may be valuable to 
suppress, or inhibit, certain associations.  
A growing body of research supports the view that experts in science 
domains suppress, rather than supplant or eradicate, their intuitive knowledge 
about scientific phenomena. This view is supported by studies that employ 
measures of reaction time (Shtulman & Varcarcel, 2012; Potvin, Masson, 
Lafortune & Cyr, 2014) and brain imaging (Dunbar, Fugelsang, & Stein, 2007; 
Foisy, Potvin, Riopel & Masson, 2015; Masson, Potvin, Riopel, & Foisy, 2014). 
This implies that somewhere in the learning process, experts learn to suppress 
their intuitions about scientific phenomena. The question then becomes, how do 
people learn to effectively suppress their intuitions? 
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One approach for teaching students to suppress inaccurate prior knowledge 
has been to encourage cognitive conflict by presenting explicitly presenting 
students with anomalous data, disconfirming information, or contradictory 
situations that violate intuitive rules. Although strategies that directly refute 
inaccurate beliefs have been successful when those beliefs are relatively isolated 
(Broughton, Sinatra, & Reynolds, 2007; Guzetti, Snyder, Glass, & Gamas, 1993), 
the results of implementing cognitive conflict are mixed when addressing 
conceptual knowledge (see Chapter 3). For example, Tirosh, Stavy, and Cohen 
(1998) attempted to influence intuitive thinking related to the intuitive rules 
‘everything comes to an end’ and ‘everything can be divided’ in relation to 
mathematical entities (i.e. quantities) and material (i.e. physical) objects. An 
instructional intervention presented two statements, one congruent with intuitive 
rules and one containing a formal rejection, and students were asked to judge the 
correctness of each statements and give reasons for their judgments. Students’ 
responses to subsequent tasks showed only minor changes to the use of intuitive 
rules. The researchers conclude that “intuitive rules are stable and resistant to 
change” (p. 1267).  
Other, subtler approaches to cognitive conflict may be fruitful for influencing 
intuitions. Researchers have examined approaches that activate inhibitory 
mechanisms prior to intuitive reasoning tasks (Stavy & Babai, 2010). These 
approaches include solving difficult reasoning problems (Attridge & Inglis, 2015), 
preactivating inhibitive processes with counterintuitive examples (Babai, Eidelman, 
& Stavy, 2012), providing warnings about the need to inhibit (Babai, Shalev, & 
Stavy, 2015), drawing attention to a relevant variable (Dembo, Levin, & Siegler, 
1997), incidental experiences of difficulty (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 
2007), and taking different perspectives (i.e. self or a logical person’s) (Amsel, 
Klaczynski, Johnston, Bench, Close, & Sadler, 2008; Klaczynski, 2001). These 
studies show that cognitive conflict strategies that operate by indirectly activating 
inhibitory mechanisms can result in changes, at least temporarily, in knowledge 
and reasoning. Changes in intuitive knowledge are observed in behavioral 
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responses to intuitive reasoning tasks in terms of accuracy and reaction times, as 
well as in brain imaging that shows activations of brain areas associated with 
inhibitory processes (Stavy & Babai, 2010).  
Further, science education researchers have demonstrated the 
effectiveness of “cognitive perturbation” strategy in improving conceptual 
knowledge (Dega, Kriek, & Mogese, 2013). This strategy involved asking students 
to consider multiple, intermediate progressive conceptions related to electricity and 
magnetism with the aid of a computer simulation. This strategy was compared to 
a “cognitive conflict” strategy, which involved presenting students with simulation 
outcomes that conflicted with their previous predictions (i.e. explicit hypothesis 
testing). Although the conceptual learning gains were relatively small on the whole, 
students in the “cognitive perturbation” condition made larger gains in conceptual 
knowledge, as measured by a conceptual inventory assessment. This result gives 
further support for considering and supporting the importance of smaller, subtler 
changes in knowledge when attempting to help students achieve conceptual 
change. 
These studies and the experiments described in this dissertation employ 
relatively short and simple, yet engaging, tasks designed to activate inhibitory 
processes. The implicit science learning tasks developed for this dissertation 
accomplished this by presenting a high volume of stimuli that were both congruent 
and incongruent with intuitions about sinking and floating. Suppression of intuitions 
was operationalized in Experiments 1 and 2 by the performance patterns observed 
on incongruent trials on the sinking and floating task. Specifically, a training 
condition was successful in achieving suppression if responses on incongruent 
trials were both less accurate and slower than for congruent trials. This was 
observed in Experiment 1 in the implicit training condition and in Experiment 2 in 
the implicit + direct training condition. This “slow down” in relation to inaccurate 
intuitions is interpreted as a subtle form of cognitive conflict that can promote the 
suppression of intuitions. 
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This approach to cognitive conflict addresses the 3 challenges for this 
strategy outlined by Limón (2001). First, indirect approaches to cognitive conflict 
create meaningful conflict without relying on student factors such as reasoning 
ability, prior knowledge, motivation, cognitive engagement, and epistemological 
beliefs. Instead, they rely on simple, yet engaging, interventions that activate 
inhibitory processes during tasks that involve intuitive rules. Second, this approach 
addresses theoretical issues related to conceptual change and the intermediate 
learning steps related to cognitive conflict. Namely, cognitive conflict happens at 
the level of implicit, intuitive knowledge rather than explicit, declarative knowledge. 
Changes that occur at this level are measured in accuracy, reaction time, and brain 
imaging data that show more inaccurate and slower responses that activate parts 
of the brain associated with inhibitory processes. Third, these interventions can be 
implemented with high fidelity without reliance on teacher strategies or training. 
Given these desirable features, applying implicit learning approaches to 
conceptual conflict can offer a fruitful strategy to be pursued in future research. 
 
The relationship between intuitive and conceptual scientific knowledge 
The division between intuitive and conceptual forms of knowledge and 
reasoning have long been proposed (e.g. West & Pines, 1984; Amsel et al., 2008). 
Importantly, “genuine conceptual learning involves the intertwining of these two 
[forms of knowledge]” (West & Pines, 1984, p. 50). However, until recently, 
approaches to conceptual change have considered both types from a theoretical 
perspective. That is, theories of conceptual change have proposed implicit 
cognitive entities such as p-prims, presuppositions, and ontological categories, in 
order to explain the existence of explicit forms of inaccurate science knowledge; 
however, they do little to explain how implicit forms of knowledge can be changed. 
As a result, the approaches to conceptual change operate largely on explicit, 
conscious learning and reasoning strategies, such as reading refuting texts (e.g. 
Broughton, Sinatra, & Reynolds, 2007), encountering anomalous information or 
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discrepant phenomena (e.g. Chinn & Brewer, 1993), or explicit training about 
empirical and ontological assumptions (e.g. Slotta & Chi, 2006).  
Although implicit learning approaches may improve scientific intuitions by 
activating productive intuitions and suppressing unproductive intuitions, questions 
remain about how these changes can be effectively leveraged to invoke 
conceptual change. First, how do learners draw connections between productive 
intuitions and conceptual knowledge needed for scientific understanding? Second, 
how does the development of conceptual knowledge influence inhibitory 
processes? Namely, does conceptual knowledge reduce the need for inhibitory 
processes, or does the ability to inhibit intuitions improve (Star & Pollack, 2015)? 
These questions highlight important issues related to the relationship between 
intuitive and conceptual knowledge. Applying implicit learning methods and 
theories can provide insights into how the types of knowledge are related. 
Much of the research on implicit learning has attempted to define and 
dissociate it from explicit forms of learning (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 
1998; Roediger, 1990; Shanks, 2004; Shanks & St. John, 1994); in fact, some 
models of implicit learning have proposed that the knowledge gained is completely 
independent from explicit knowledge (e.g. Lewicki, 1986). On the other hand, 
others suggest that implicit learning can result in explicit, conscious knowledge 
through the processes of “chunking” (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990), pattern 
recognition (Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, & Cho, 1989), or 
representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1986). Although the spontaneous 
development of conscious knowledge is possible, this knowledge is likely to be 
fragmented and incomplete (Mathews et al., 1989; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). 
Thus, further support is needed to develop complete and accurate conceptual 
knowledge. For example, having learners make self-explanations about 
anomalous examples has been shown to increase belief revision when there is a 
high occurrence of anomalies (Williams, Walker, & Lombrozo, 2012).  
Research on implicit learning has implications for the role of prior knowledge 
in relation to inhibitory processes. Implicit learning can be helped or hindered by 
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prior knowledge, depending the nature of the knowledge. Presenting explicit 
knowledge about artificial grammar rule structures can enhance implicit learning 
when presented beforehand by focusing attention on relevant strings (Reber et al., 
1980). When an artificial grammar invokes prior knowledge in an incongruent 
fashion (i.e. expectations are violated), implicit learning is enhanced (Ziori, Pothos, 
& Dienes, 2014). Thus, prior knowledge can enhance implicit learning by both 
setting and violating expectations. In both cases, prior knowledge supports implicit 
learning by focusing learners’ attention on relevant features. However, in the case 
of violated expectations, engaging inhibitory mechanisms may encourage search 
for relevant associations. This would be consistent with research findings that 
show that infants spontaneously explore when their expectations are violated 
(Stahl & Feigenson, 2015) and brain imaging studies that show that activating 
inhibition can increase logical thinking (Houdé, Zago, Mellet, Moutier, Pineau, 
Mazoyer, Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2000). This also further demonstrates the separate, 
yet related, natures of implicit and explicit knowledge. 
 
Implications for other areas of research 
The research presented in this dissertation has broader empirical, 
theoretical, and pragmatic implications for others areas of research, including 
cognitive psychology, learning science, and science education.  
Empirically, this research demonstrates that implicit learning paradigms 
from cognitive psychology can be applied to a scientific domain important for 
education. While implicit learning theory has been applied in the area of second 
language acquisition (e.g. DeKeyser, 2003; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012), implicit 
learning tasks have not been widely-applied in academic content areas. The 
research presented here also that extends previous findings from reaction time 
studies on intuitions in mathematics (e.g., Babai, Zilber, Stavy, & Tirosh, 2010; 
Stavy & Babai, 2010) and science (Babai & Amsterdamer, 2008; Babai, Sekal, & 
Stavy, 2009; Potvin et al., 2014; Shtulman & Varcarcel, 2012). The results of this 
study are consistent with the common finding across reaction-time studies of 
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intuitive ideas: increased reaction times in responses to stimuli that are 
incongruent with intuitions. While reaction time studies of sinking and floating 
objects have been previously reported (Potvin et al., 2014), this study extended 
these findings by presenting single objects (rather than pairs) along with 
quantitative data, as well as by examining multiple intuitive rules. These methods 
offer a more fine-grained analysis required to understand transitional knowledge 
states involved in conceptual change processes (diSessa & Sherin, 1998; Limón, 
2001). 
The theoretical contributions of this dissertation lie in the connections drawn 
between theories of conceptual change and implicit learning. This dissertation 
provides two key insights that bring research from these fields together. First, 
implicit learning is a source of intuitive prior knowledge students bring to the 
classroom. Although conceptual change researchers have theorized about implicit 
conceptual entities, these accounts do not account for how they are acquired. 
Some researchers, particularly developmental psychologists, have argued that the 
mental structures underlying intuitive physics and psychology are innate or 
endowed (e.g. Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Gelman, 2004); others have challenged this 
claim of innateness, arguing for an epigenetic view of cognitive development (see 
Spencer, Blumberg, McMurray, Robinson, Samuelson, & Tomblin, 2009). An 
alternative view of the development of early intuitive science knowledge is that 
humans possess a general-purpose implicit learning mechanism that, beginning in 
early development, is applied to learn from perceptual experiences of the world. 
These mechanisms enable to people to extract patterns in physical and social 
phenomena from relatively sparse perceptual input.  
A second key theoretical connection is in regard to the nature of intuitive 
science knowledge and its representation in cognitive systems. As Taber (2008) 
wrote, “the nature of the scientific concepts themselves, and the contexts in which 
they are evoked, are likely to be significant factors that interact with features of the 
individual’s cognitive structure” (p. 1034). Viewing scientific intuitions as products 
of implicit learning suggests (a) they are qualitatively different from explicit, 
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declarative knowledge, and (b) they are not likely to be changed via explicit 
knowledge or conflict. This view of the nature of intuitive knowledge has important 
implications for theories of conceptual change. For example, the second step in 
the prevalence model of conceptual change (Potvin, 2013) involves installing 
inhibitive “stop signs” for intuitions that lead to misconceptions. Potvin suggests 
that these “cognitive conflicts should be preferably induced by experimental 
means, letting nature reinforce (or not) the available conceptions or intuitions. 
These means should be numerous, rich, and astute in order to prevent any 
important misleading intuitions from eluding teachers’ efforts” (p. 16). As shown in 
this dissertation research, implicit learning tasks provide a means for both 
reinforcing and inhibiting scientific intuitions by engaging in numerous and rich 
examples, while providing subtle feedback to students without requiring high 
teacher effort. However, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that providing explicit 
conceptual information prior to implicit learning tasks (i.e. direct + implicit condition) 
may hinder the installment of inhibitive “stop signs” that were present when implicit 
learning tasks were presented first.  
From a pragmatic standpoint, implementing implicit learning tasks to 
activate and suppress intuitive thinking in educational settings offers a “less is 
more” approach to learning science. Given current and ongoing efforts to engage 
all students in deep knowledge, skills, and cross-cutting themes in science (AAAS, 
1993; National Research Council, 2012), there is a high need for instructional 
methods that reduce, rather than exacerbate, differences in individuals’ abilities, 
characteristics, and environmental settings. Implicit learning tasks offer several 
advantages in this regard. First, implicit learning abilities are dissociated from 
psychometric intelligence, and are more robust and evenly distributed across the 
population and across age (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2009). 
Thus, implicit learning tasks are less dependent on individual abilities to be 
effective. Second, implicit learning tasks are relatively short interventions that 
require low effort; therefore, student characteristics such as prior knowledge, 
motivation and interests, epistemological beliefs, and cognitive engagement are 
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less likely to influence their effectiveness. Finally, because similar scientific 
intuitions are found across populations of students, tasks developed in one context 
are likely to be effective for students in another context. Thus, development of 
implicit learning tasks for various science topics, following the guidelines 
established in Chapter 3, are likely to be scalable interventions, particularly with 
the aid of technology. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
 The results of this study show that a relatively brief implicit learning 
intervention can impact scientific intuitions about sinking and floating objects. This 
task results in inaccurate, but slower, responses to trials where intuitive predictions 
are incongruent with scientific ones. While there were significant changes in 
intuitive knowledge across conditions, the differences in conceptual knowledge 
scores were not significant. This was likely due to an underpowered sample size 
for each experiment, as significant differences in conceptual knowledge were 
found between experiments when samples were pooled (i.e. higher scores in 
Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 1). This may have also been due to lack of sensitivity 
and precision in the assessment tasks to differentiate among participants with 
different levels of conceptual knowledge. Thus, further replication with larger 
samples and refinement of the conceptual knowledge measures should be 
pursued in future research. 
 Another key limitation was due to the sample of participants. The sample 
across both experiments included a high proportion of females (81%), likely due to 
the fact that participants were recruited from undergraduate classes in the College 
of Education (61% female) and College of Design (67% female), which have higher 
proportions of female students. Thus, while there are no theoretical reasons to 
expect gender differences in the measures employed in this study, inferences 
should be tentatively applied to more general populations. 
 The sample in this study was chosen for convenience and to capture a wide 
range of prior knowledge. Participants in these experiments were likely to have 
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encountered instruction on the topic of buoyancy / sinking and floating. Although 
participants in this population showed evidence of employing intuitive rules, these 
results may not apply to other populations of interest, such as upper elementary or 
middle school students. Implementation of implicit learning tasks with students at 
relevant grade levels should be a high priority for future research. 
 The experiments designed here did not address long-term retention of 
changes to intuitive knowledge. That is, we do not know whether these changes 
were retained beyond the 1-hour learning session. Although there is evidence from 
studies employing similar interventions to suggest that these changes are relatively 
durable (Chasseigne et al., 2010), further research is needed to demonstrate an 
extended effect for this task. 
 A practical extension of this work would be to examine how intuitive 
reasoning about material in relation to sinking and floating can be leveraged when 
teaching about density. For example, in the sample of items used in these 
experiments, implementing a material-based rule strategy would lead to an 89% 
accuracy rate. Further, a material-based strategy is 100% accurate for objects 
made of wood and wax, suggesting a productive intuitive rule for making sinking 
and floating predictions. The question becomes, how can instruction capitalize on 
this intuitive rule? One possible strategy is employing self-explanations for 
incongruent examples (Williams, Walker, & Lombrozo, 2012), while another might 
be providing conceptual explanations for materials at the molecular level (similar 
to the implicit + direct condition). Future studies may be more successful in 
changing explicit conceptual knowledge by employing additional strategies. 
 Another area of research that may prove fruitful is in developing models for 
the response profiles for the sinking and floating prediction task. While we were 
able to find differences across condition in response patterns by looking at 
differences in accuracy and response times across congruent and incongruent 
trials, further analysis of response patterns may provide additional information 
about the effect of these interventions. Further, computational models of learning 
may provide additional insight into how implicit learning results in the patterns of 
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responses observed. Two possible candidates for computational models are 
connectionist / PDP models (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986) and Bayesian inference models (Gopnik & Bonawitz, 2014; 
Prefors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2011). Each of these models have been 
successfully applied, respectively, to implicit learning (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, 
& Boyer, 1998) and cognitive development (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & 
Goodman, 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 This investigation has proposed and demonstrated how theory and 
methods from research on implicit learning can be applied to science learning to 
enhance conceptual change. The experiments presented here show evidence for 
the activation and suppression of scientific intuitions using tasks that involve 
making simple judgments about numerous examples. These changes in intuitive 
knowledge are important for gaining mature scientific understanding associated 
with conceptual change. 
 Both researchers and practitioners may find interest in the research 
presented here. For researchers, grounding theories of conceptual change in 
cognitive processes can provide insights into unresolved issues regarding the 
nature of misconceptions and the role of cognitive conflict. Practitioners may gain 
an appreciation for the complex learning that students are capable of achieving, 
despite a lack of ability to explicitly state what they have learned. For both, I hope 
it provides excitement about the possibilities for tapping into learning abilities that 
have been, up until now, largely ignored. 
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Appendix B: Rubric for Reasoning Prompts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Level Description Examples 
0 Provides no or redundant 
reasoning; may refer to 
intuitive ideas as justification 
[no reasoning provided]; 
"Because it will be heavier"; 
"Hollow things float" 
1 Provides either good 
reasoning with a faulty 
premise; or correct premise 
with faulty reasoning 
"It doesn't depend on the size 
of the object but the material." 
"The volume is the same, but 
there is more mass." 
2 Provides good reasoning 
and accurate premises and 
conclusions 
"The density of the object is 
the same as before" 
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Appendix C: Rubric for Pre-Post Density Knowledge 
Prompt 
 
 
 
Prompt: Do you know a rule, or set of rules, that can be used to make 
predictions about whether an object will sink or float in 
water? If so, describe the rule(s) below. 
Score Code Response Examples 
0 DK "Don't know" or similar response "Not sure"; "I don't 
know"; "Can't 
remember" 
1 MC A rule that reflects superficial 
understanding ("Heavy objects 
sink" "light objects float"); or 
other "Misconception" 
"If an object is heavy or 
made of certain 
materials" 
2 Density-
inaccurate 
Mentions "density", but does not 
provide an accurate description 
or definition (can either be 
missing or inaccurate); may 
include a misconception about 
density; may say "mass and 
volume and material" but not 
explicitly use the word "density" 
"It has to do with density" 
"More dense objects 
sink" (with no definition) 
3 Density+water Mentions "density", along with a 
rule related to sinking and 
floating in water (i.e. greater 
density of water = sink; less 
density float) 
"If the object is more 
dense than water, it will 
sink; if it is less dense 
than water, float" 
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4 Density+definition Mentions "density" along with an 
accurate description of the term; 
this might include "mass divided 
by volume" or "ratio of weight to 
size"; may discuss displacement 
of water; may or may not relate 
density of object to the density of 
water 
"An object's density - if 
the density if greater 
than 1 g/ml, it will sink; 
less it will float" 
5 Density+forces Mentions "density" (or related 
term like buoyancy), along with 
rule and description of forces 
that cause objects to sink or float 
"An object floats if the 
buoyant force is equal to 
the gravitational force; 
this depends on the 
mass of the object and 
how much water it 
displaces" 
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Appendix D: Direct Instruction Content for Experiment 2 
Materials adapted from American Chemical Society. 
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